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ABSTRACT 
 This research examines whether distributing energy storage systems (ESS) 
improves microgrid resilience. A resilience definition appropriate for a military context 
substantiates the selection of three resilience measures for quantifying the change in 
resilience between a single ESS baseline microgrid architecture, and double and 
quintuple ESS architectures. Mission impact (MI) from Peterson (2019), islanding time 
from Van Broekhoven et al. (2014), and average θ glideslope, θg, adapted from Wang 
and Yoda (2016), are the resilience measures used by a modified resilience analysis 
process (RAP) adapted from Vugrin et al. (2017). Three equivalent hazard simulation 
models only differ in the number of ESSs geographically distributed across the 
microgrid. Macro-enabled MS Excel-based versions of the Monterey Microgrid 
Simulation Model (Peterson 2019) execute scenario simulations in an hourly timestep 
over a 24-hour period presenting hazards ranging from component failures to wide-area 
destructive events (e.g., explosions). The analyses identify greater resilience in 
microgrids with distributed ESS versus centralized ESS. Furthermore, increased inter-bus 
connections and energy flow combinations improve resilience in concert with increased 
ESS distribution. 
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Energy resilience is becoming increasingly important to persevere disruptions from 
environmental hazards, aging infrastructure, network-centric warfighting, and other threats 
to security. Marqusee, Schultz, and Robyn describe how energy is the lifeblood of DOD 
installations comprised of 284,000 buildings that consumed 1% of the total electric energy 
consumed in the U.S in FY2015 (2017). Thompson (2018) explains that 99% of the 
electricity used at Continental United States (CONUS) military sites comes from upstream 
sources “outside the fence”—meaning off-base—while Van Broekhoven et al. (2012) state 
commercial utility grid companies have few incentives for improving the reliability of an 
aging utility grid. Microgrids provide a means to increase energy security and resilience on 
DOD installations through pooling of local energy resources. While energy resilience on 
DOD installations has been improved by using microgrids, much work remains to be done 
to further improve the resilience of power delivery to tenant commands during grid outages 
and other power disruption events.  
This research examines whether distributing energy storage systems (ESSs)  
improves microgrid resilience. Currently, the few bases with ESS installed have one 
centrally located ESS. The Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model (Peterson 2019) is used 
to examine if resilience improves when moving from a single ESS (baseline) architecture 
to a double ESS or a quintuple ESS architecture with the ESSs geographically distributed 
across the microgrid. Specific initiating events that cause microgrid disruption are 
examined such as fire, tornado, and others throughout each of their hazard scenarios. This 
research hypothesizes that distributing ESS improves microgrid resilience and tests 
whether distributed energy storage leads to greater microgrid resilience. 
Resilience in the context of a military microgrid is important to define. The thesis 
defines resilience as the ability of the microgrid to avoid or withstand stress events by 
continuing to complete a task or execute a course of action under specific conditions and 
level of performance or else; to adapt to and compensate for resultant strains to minimize 
compromise via graceful degradation.  
xxii 
This definition includes behavior characteristics from Taft (2018) and the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) definition of capability in a 
projected operating environment (Chief of Naval Operations n.d.). This resilience 
definition guides the selection of the following resilience measures to quantify the change 
in resilience between the single ESS baseline microgrid architecture and the double and 
quintuple ESS architectures: 
1. Peterson’s Mission Impact (MI) (2019),  
2. Wang and Yodo’s θ (2016), and  
3. Van Broekhoven et al’s islanding time (2014).  
Peterson assigns MI for each microgrid facility as the stakeholder-assigned 
consequence rate for each hour a facility’s energy requirements are not met. MI can be 
quantified using the Mission Dependency Index (MDI) discussed in Eisenberg, Alderson, 
and Templeton (2018). Wang and Yodo’s θ (2016) is modified to track averaged 
performance changes from a disruptive event to null performance. This thesis measures 
islanding time in continuous survival hours after a disruptive event where the microgrid 
continues to provide power to facilities. The above resilience metrics and proposed 
definition are used in a modified version of Sandia National Lab’s resilience analysis 
process (RAP) evaluated the three microgrid architectures of interest . 
 Peterson’s Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model (2019) is adapted using MS 
Excel to conduct microgrid simulations of the three microgrid architectures. Everything is 
held constant except for the distribution of ESS in the system. Specifically, the quintuple 
ESS microgrid architecture implements a ring-bus connection versus the hub and spoke 
feeder connections in the other microgrid architectures to connect each ESS to the facility 
collocated with and to connect with other facilities directly. The geographic locations of 
the double and quintuple ESSs are distributed across the microgrid. Facility energy 
consumption data parameters are derived from the Department of Energy (DOE) (U.S. 
DOE EERE 2012). PV Array energy output data parameters are derived from National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (2010).  
Experimentation results from the hazard scenario simulations are summarized for 
the single (baseline) ESS, double ESS, and quintuple ESS microgrid in Table 1. 
xxiii 
Table 1. Three Microgrid Architectures’ Resilience Compared across 
Several Hazard Scenarios 
 
The most favorable resilience measure results are highlighted in green. The least favorable 
resilience measure values are highlighted in red. Neutral resilience measure values that do 
not fall under the previous two categories are highlighted in yellow. Less MI is better 
because it indicates a shorter outage duration for critical loads. A θg value closer to 0-
degrees is more desirable because it indicates less drastic drops in the microgrid’s ability 
to serve critical loads. This table shows that the quintuple ESS microgrid architecture has 
the greatest resilience for the ten hazard scenarios simulated. Note that for hazards 
involving geographic events such as tornados and forest fires, the double ESS architecture 
can perform worse than the single ESS architecture due to the distributed ESS being within 
the area impacted by the hazard.  
 
Table 1 shows how the quintuple ESS microgrid architecture achieves the most 
favorable resilience measures for every hazard scenario. The largest resilience 
improvement—from the single ESS (baseline) microgrid to the distributed quintuple ESS 
microgrid—is illuminated in the dual generator failure and tornado hazard scenarios. In the 
tornado hazard scenario, the quintuple ESS microgrid improves MI by 57% from the single 
ESS (baseline) microgrid. This MI improvement is equivalent to the most mission-
dependent building—the Large Building EP5 at 200 MI per hour—gaining an additional 

























5250 -1.79 16 5360 -1.71 16 3860 -1.61 >24
Dual Generator 
Failure
7680 -6.63 9 6360 -4.00 16 4990 -3.24 >24
Single ESS Failure 5280 -1.60 16 4930 -1.55 18 3870 -1.48 >24
PV Array Destroyed 5050 -1.64 16 4940 -1.46 16 3780 -1.45 >24
Two Main Buses 
Isolated
5510 -2.88 >24 4290 -2.33 >24 3910 -1.55 >24
All Buses Isolated 5510 -2.88 >24 4290 -2.33 >24 5280 -1.60 >24
Explosion 5410 -1.98 16 5300 -2.09 16 4100 -1.70 >24
Tornado 8760 -7.66 7 6600 -3.75 16 3740 -1.59 >24
Forest Fire 5930 -1.95 13 7060 -2.63 9 3910 -1.64 >24
 Microgrid Comparison Legend: 
Most Favorable (Best)= Neutral = Least Favorable (Worst) =
Quintuple ESS Microgrid ESS Simulations Single ESS Microgrid Double ESS Microgrid
xxiv 
quintuple ESS microgrid architecture average θg indicates 79% less drastic performance 
loss than the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. Islanding time for the quintuple ESS 
microgrid architecture is >24 hours across all scenarios. Conversely, the single ESS 
(baseline) microgrid architecture has seven scenarios with less than 17 hours of islanding 
time. The double ESS microgrid generally has slightly more favorable resilience measures 
than the single ESS, except during the forest fire hazard scenario that engulfs the 2nd ESS. 
The quintuple ESS shows a 16% MI improvement compared to the single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid even in the no-hazard test due to load shedding behavior in the MS Excel solver-
based microgrid control logic.  
The thesis results indicate distributed energy storage leads to increased microgrid 
resilience. Two scenarios that show the greatest resilience improvement are tornado and 
dual generator failure hazard scenarios. The tornado hazard scenario shows distributing 
quintuple ESS improves MI by 57%, average θg by 79%, and islanding time by 17 hours. 
In the dual generator failure hazard scenario, distributing quintuple ESS improved MI by 
35%, average θg by 51%, and islanding time by 15 hours. Thus, decentralizing ESS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many Department of Defense (DOD) installations are heavily reliant on outside 
commercial power sources and are vulnerable to power interruptions. The Defense Science 
Board (2008) warned, “Critical missions at military installations are vulnerable to a loss 
from commercial power outages and inadequate backup power supplies” (Defense Science 
Board 2008).  
The U.S. spends nearly $2 billion per day on military readiness, yet national 
security is dependent on power sources that are often beyond the DOD’s control 
(Thompson 2018). Other DOD installations support military readiness through sensitive 
research and development, testing, maintenance, training, and cyclical deployment 
preparations (S. Van Broekhoven et al. 2013). Essential defense installations are often 
unable to function if electrical power is unavailable for more than a few days (Thompson 
2018). 
A complex system of over six million miles of transmission and distribution lines 
comprises the U.S. electricity grid; CONUS DOD installations reside at the end of many 
transmission feeders (Van Broekhoven et al. 2012). The situation is similar at outside 
contiguous U.S. (OCONUS) DOD installations. DOD installations are vulnerable to 
upstream service disruptions from cyber-based attacks and natural causes such as downed 
power lines (Van Broekhoven et al. 2012). Thompson (2018) explains that 99% of the 
electricity used at CONUS military sites comes from upstream sources “outside the 
fence”—meaning off-base—while Van Broekhoven et al. (2012) state commercial utility 
grid companies have few incentives for improving the reliability of an aging utility grid. 
Standalone generators are the primary source of backup power on DOD 
installations. Current energy policies allow tenant commands to autonomously acquire 
standalone generators for reducing significant risk to their individual missions. A typical 
large base has 100–200 standalone generators, which provide a high degree of facility-
specific operator control and individual affordability. However, individual control and 
affordability of using standalone generators often forfeit energy teaming opportunities on 
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the same installation. If a building’s standalone generator fails during a power outage, the 
entire building will lose power. Power from other standalone generators at nearby buildings 
generally is not available because the generators are not interconnected.  
Microgrids provide a means to increase energy security and resilience on DOD 
installations through pooling of energy resources. Many DOD installations have existing 
microgrids or are in the process of upgrading existing electric infrastructure to support 
microgrids. However, much work remains to be done to ensure power delivery to tenant 
commands during grid outages and other power disruption events. 
Marqusee, Schultz, and Robyn describe how energy is the lifeblood of DOD 
installations comprised of 284,000 buildings that consumed 1% of the total electric energy 
consumed in the U.S in FY 2015 (2017). Energy resilience is becoming increasingly 
important for network-centric warfighting. The prevalent standalone backup generator 
strategy is insufficient for meeting CONUS and OCONUS DOD installation resilience 
requirements. 
A. MOTIVATION 
This research effort is focused on determining whether distributing energy storage 
across a DOD facility leads to greater resilience in DOD microgrids. Distributing energy 
storage involves replacing a single centralized energy storage system (ESS) with multiple 
distributed ESSs located at or near critical loads. This research finds that increasing the 
number of ESSs on a microgrid improves microgrid system resilience in certain situations. 
One way of improving system resilience is by using a reliability technique where increasing 
the number of parallel components, similar to increasing the number of engines on an 
airplane, provides redundant paths to success. This system reliability concept can be 
applied to ESSs on a microgrid to improve resilience. System reliability compared to n-




Figure 1. Parallel System Reliability vs. Component Reliability. 
Adapted from Leemis (n.d.). 
Figure 1 shows how system reliability is increased by an increased number of 
parallel components providing multiple success pathways. Increased ESS quantities may 
result in greater resilience of microgrids when comparing the failure of a system with 
multiple distributed ESS against failure on a microgrid with only one centralized ESS. In 
addition to system reliability improvements, increased ESS quantities increase the number 
of ESS that could supply energy to critical system loads, reduce discharge-rate strain on 
individual ESS. This research is, in part, motivated by the anticipated benefit to the 
resilience of increasing microgrid reliability through multiple redundant ESS and focuses 
4 
on testing what ESS distribution strategies may be beneficial to improving resilience in 
microgrids. 
This thesis progresses the understanding of how to design a DOD microgrid system 
to improve resilience, specifically on installations. This thesis serves as a reference for 
facility energy managers in determining how to distribute ESS on a microgrid. 
Understanding microgrid resilience is required for determining how to make microgrid 
configurations more resilient through distributed ESS. This research serves as a guiding 
vector for developing a decision-making tool for how energy managers should distribute 
ESS to improve microgrid resilience. 
B. BACKGROUND 
This section provides background on DOD energy security and microgrid and ESS 
background. The microgrid and ESS background include high-level information about 
what they are, what makes them useful, how they interact with neighboring systems, 
microgrid architecture, capabilities, assumptions, and limitations. This background section 
further introduces and defines microgrid and ESS terms.  
1. DOD Energy Security 
DOD doctrine has categorized critical power demands, invoked installation 
resilience measures, and defined two different power requirement types. According to 
DoDI 4170.11 (2018), critical energy requirements are “those critical mission operations 
on military installations requiring a continuous supply of energy in the event of an energy 
disruption or emergency.” The other category is non-critical or “interruptible” loads that 
do not require uninterrupted power (NAVFAC 2019). In addition to these two power 
demand categories, DOD doctrine prescribes “days-of-autonomy” as a measure for military 
installation energy resilience (Peterson 2019). Naval facilities are required to achieve seven 
days of autonomy per UFC 3–540-1. The Army requires 14 days without external power 
and water for critical missions (ASA 2017). Marines require mission operability off the 
grid for at least 14 days (Coglianese 2019). Air Force Instruction (AFI) AFI32-1062: 
“Electrical Systems, Power Plants and Generators” requires refueling plans to support 
generator operation of not less than seven days (AFI 2015). AFI 32–1084: “Facility 
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Requirements” identify backup generator requirements for specific facilities based on the 
mission (AFI 2016). Power requirement categories are important for scoping the problem, 
defining resource priorities, and forming an energy security strategy. Using “Days-of-
autonomy,” an absolute measure is important for setting the desired end-state capability in 
terms of an absolute capability.  
Financial resource limitations at Naval Facilities and Engineering Command 
(NAVFAC) have spurred the need to assess energy dependency and prioritize energy 
security improvements. NAVFAC has begun surveying their installations and tenant 
organizations for energy dependencies and mission impacts due to power disruptions. 
Since 2018, NAVFAC has used a series of questions to compute a facility’s mission 
dependency index (MDI) (Peterson 2019). Kujawski and Miller identified deficiencies in 
the MDI, including time dependency of corrective actions, MDI scoring equation, and 
inconsistencies in the application (Peterson 2019; Kujawski and Miller 2009). 
2. Microgrid and ESS Overview 
Microgrids on DOD installations are increasingly being viewed as a method to 
increase energy security. At most CONUS DOD installations, microgrids traditionally 
operate connected to and in concert with the local utility grid (macro grid); however, DOD 
installation microgrids can often be disconnected and function independently as dictated 
by physical, operational, political, or economic conditions (Berkeley Lab 2019). 
Maintaining functionality during adverse physical conditions with the centralized grid is 
an attractive capability for improving energy security through increased resilience. 
OCONUS DOD installation microgrids also often are grid-connected to national power 
networks of host countries. However, in some instances, OCONUS DOD installations are 
fully “islanded”——completely disconnected—from external electrical energy networks. 
Van Broekhoven et al. (2012) reported the closest U.S government-approved 
microgrid definition came from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Microgrid 
Exchange Group.  
A microgrid is a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy 
resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that act as a single 
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controllable entity with respect to the grid. A microgrid can connect and 
disconnect from the grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected and 
islanding-mode.  
A modern microgrid is essentially the pooling of dispatchable and non-dispatchable 
generators, ESS, and controllable and non-controllable loads to form a greater resilience 
capability than the sum of the individual contributions. Solar and wind power are non-
dispatchable energy sources where output is dependent on many factors (Afework et al. 
2018). When configured appropriately, microgrids offer solutions to increase energy 
resilience through an interconnected alliance of resources. Configuration decisions include 
the selection and sizing of components such as generators and ESSs.  
Microgrids are becoming increasingly popular for increasing resilience through 
networking distributed energy resources (DERs) and backup generator capabilities. Some 
of these DERs include ESSs. ESSs are important in microgrids because they store power 
and provide it when needed. Mohanned et al. (2019) has defined a variety of ESSs with a 
few examples in the following bullets: 
 Battery energy storage systems (BESS) 
 Pump hydro energy storage (PHES) 
 Compressed air energy storage systems (CAESS) 
 Flywheel energy storage systems (FESS) 
 Fuel cell (FC) 
Although there are many intricacies across ESS types, generalized ESS capability 
measurements include energy capacity (MWh), a power rating (MW), and a ramp-rate 
(World Nuclear Association 2020). General power and capacity capabilities for a variety 
of ESSs are depicted in Figure 2 (Mohanned et al. 2019). 
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Figure 2. ESS Power and Capacity Measures. Source: Mohanned et 
al. (2019).  
Figure 2 shows how low and high-speed FESSs have a high-power output but 
limited energy capacity. PHES is shown to have a high energy capacity and power rating, 
but there is a limitation not captured in Figure 2. PHES has a slow ramp rate, which defines 
how quickly it can be “throttled” to different power output settings in response to demand 
changes. PHES ramp rate cannot compete with FESS in ramp rate and consequently timely 
response power output demand fluctuations. Understanding these measurements and their 
interplay is important for selecting the appropriate ESS when configuring microgrids. 
ESSs enhance the resilience and reliability of a microgrid as a secondary generation 
source and a control element. ESSs allow energy to be stored and later reconverted to 
electricity on demand. This is useful for offsetting the generation variability of renewable 
sources such as wind and solar and peak load shaving when demand momentarily exceeds 
generator capacity. Through analysis of equipment failure, Chris Peterson has concluded a 
“microgrid system is most impacted by the failure of the energy storage system (ESS).” 
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3. Microgrid Architecture 
The physical architecture of a microgrid generally consists of four types of 
components:  
1. Distributed generation (DG) (e.g., diesel generators),  
2. ESS 
3. Distribution systems 
4. Communication and control systems.  
A simple microgrid architecture is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. A Basic Microgrid Architecture. Source: Mariam, Basu, 
and Conlon (2013). 
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Figure 3 shows that DGs are represented by images of renewables (i.e., wind and 
solar) and fossil fuel generators. Images labeled “Storage” include a battery—representing 
a BESS—and a flywheel—indicating a FESS—represent the two ESSs. The electrical 
distribution system is indicated by the red lines connecting to sources via microgeneration 
control (MC) nodes and sinks via load controls (LC) nodes. The microgrid system central 
control (MGCC) is represented as a single entity and downstream from the PCC to manage 
its overall MC energy generation and LC load consumption. Energy generation, storage, 
distribution, and control constitute the fundamental architecture of a microgrid. 
4. Microgrid Capabilities 
Microgrids provide unique capabilities to increase energy security through 
increased resilience from hazard events, which otherwise cause power interruptions and 
subsequent mission impacts. Eto (2009) explains, “a key feature of a microgrid is its ability, 
during a utility grid disturbance, to separate and isolate itself from the utility seamlessly 
with little or no disruption to the loads within the microgrid.” Maintaining functionality 
during adverse physical conditions with the centralized grid is an attractive capability for 
improving energy security through microgrid resilience.  
Two distinct capabilities must emphasize the definition of a microgrid. A microgrid 
must be able to seamlessly isolate from utility grid disruptions and continue to support 
installation facility power requirements while disconnected. When viewed as a “micro” 
derivative of the utility grid (macrogrid), an electrical boundary—generally downstream a 
single point of common coupling (PCC)—is required to enable the switch to islanding-
mode. An islanding-mode of microgrid operation occurs when disconnected from the 
utility grid. When perceived as an evolvement from standalone backup generators, a 
microgrid controller is required for self-governing distributed generation (DG) resources, 
ESS, and power distribution systems (Berkeley Lab 2018; Hirsch and Guerrero 2018).  
5. Microgrid Assumptions 
Two assumptions maintain the boundary of analyzing the distribution of ESSs or 
the purposes of this research: 
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Assumption 1: Failure of intermediate components or connections between MGCC 
and LCs or MCs would realistically cause control and stability issues. Since microgrid 
control and stability are beyond this research’s scope, connections to the MGCC are 
assumed not to be required. Microgrid components are assumed to incorporate peer-to-peer 
and plug-and-play concepts. The peer-to-peer concept eliminates a requirement for an 
MGCC, and the microgrid can continue to operate with the loss of LCs or MCs. The plug-
and-play concept allows components to be connected at any point on the microgrid without 
“reengineering its controls.” This plug-and-play is a reasonable future capability 
assumption based on the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions 
(CERTS) microgrid tested on the American Electric Power (AEP) full-scale testbed.  
Assumption 2: The second assumption involves current flow restrictions and 
frequency control. Electric current is assumed to flow from sources of generation, MCs, to 
sources of demand, LCs, without conflict at intersections between different MCs. 
Overcurrent and other flow protections of microgrid components are assumed to be 
sufficiently protected at every node on the microgrid simulation model. Perfect microgrid 
frequency control, voltage control, and current flow assumptions are further related to 
microgrid stability limitations. 
6. Microgrid Limitations 
Islanded microgrids have relatively fewer loads and generation sources, leading to 
frequency instability challenges due to limited connections and significantly less inertia 
compared to utility grids. Alizadeh et al. state, “ frequency stability is an important issue 
for the operation of islanded microgrids” (2019). The very fast transient responses of 
microgrid power sources reduce the system’s overall inertia (Alizadeh, Nozadian et al. 
2019). This lack of inertia results in large frequency fluctuations in response to large 
changes in energy demands from loads and energy generation from non-dispatched 
sources. These frequency fluctuations are aggravated by response delays between increased 
demand and the ramp-rate or potentially startup time of internal microgrid generation 
sources. The largest potential for load fluctuation is from an unanticipated load or rapid 
transition from grid-connected mode to islanding-mode.  
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7. Initiating Events to Microgrid Engagements 
Initiating events (IEs) are used to define the start of scenarios for testing the 
microgrid simulation model developed in this research. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) defines an IE as “an incident that requires an automatic or operator-
initiated action to bring the system into a safe and steady-state condition” (1993). Further, 
“initiating events are usually categorized in divisions of internal and external initiators 
reflecting the origin of the events” (IAEA 1993). 
This research categorizes IEs into two different types depending on whether the 
event is internal or external to the microgrid. Internal events pertain within the microgrid 
(inside the PCC), and external events are outside the PCC on the utility grid. An example 
of an external IE is the loss of power from the utility grid. An example of an internal IE is 
the failure of a generator connected to the microgrid. Actions that bring a microgrid to a 
safe and steady-state condition in response to an IE can be either preemptive (done before 
the IE) or reactive (done after the IE) and are undertaken to increase the resilience of a 
microgrid. This thesis interchangeably refers to IEs also as hazard events. This IE definition 
also applies to hazard events.  
8. Grid Resilience 
Electric grid resilience is defined by Taft (2018) as “the ability to avoid or withstand 
microgrid stress events without suffering operational compromise or to adapt to and 
compensate for the resultant strains so as to minimize compromise via graceful 
degradation. It is in large part about what does not happen to the grid or electricity.” Taft 
further explains that “a perfectly resilient grid would not experience any outages because 
it’s about what does not happen” (2018). Chapter II incorporates the following definition 
of microgrid resilience for the DOD context as proposed in this research: 
DOD Installation Microgrid Resilience (proposed): The ability to avoid 
or withstand microgrid stress events by continuing to complete a task or 
execute a course of action under specific conditions and level of 
performance or else; to adapt to and compensate for resultant strains to 
minimize compromise via graceful degradation.  
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This definition incorporates both the intrinsic stress and strain components of 
resilience from Taft’s (2018) definition and the JCIDS (2015) definition for capability, 
further explained in the literature review of Chapter II. Factors that contribute to microgrid 
resilience enable microgrids to resist losing capabilities (i.e., preventing impact from IEs). 
Switching from grid-connected to islanding mode is an example of a microgrid resisting a 
power outage by transitioning to internal DERs. ESS contribute to microgrid resilience 
through peak load shaving that would otherwise cause disruptions. Multiple ESSs, to the 
point where the loss of an ESS does not incur any distinguishable losses, is the pinnacle of 
microgrid resilience.  
C. RESEARCH SCOPE 
This research intends to serve as an initial reference for installation energy 
managers in deciding whether to distribute energy storage to improve microgrid resilience. 
An understanding of microgrid resilience is required for discovering how to identify 
improvements. The scope of this research encompasses a single microgrid simulation 
reference, three levels of ESS distribution, energy flow abstractions, and limited hazard 
scenarios. The microgrid simulation model and baseline architecture are modeled after the 
five facilities, PV array, dual generators, and a single ESS configuration from the Monterey 
Microgrid Simulation Model. Evolvements of this model encompass a double and 
quintuple ESS microgrid. Overall capacities and output capabilities are held constant to 
avoid cost-benefit interactions. The flow of electrical energy generated from local sources 
to facilities is referenced at the KWh level in hourly simulation timesteps. Simulation 
periods do not exceed 24-hours. This energy abstraction avoids load transients, frequency 
stability, and other electrically specific interactions at smaller timesteps. Simulations are 
deterministic and only involve a limited set of generalized hazard scenarios with nominal 
parameters from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This scope 
focuses the research on an initial determination for testing whether distributed ESS leads 
to greater resilience of microgrids. Distributing energy storage to improve microgrid 
resilience was the hypothesized outcome of this thesis. Ultimately, this research answers 
the following thesis question: 
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Does distributed energy storage lead to greater microgrid resilience?  
This chapter identifies the energy resilience issues prevalent amongst CONUS and 
OCONUS DOD Installations and introduces microgrids as a solution to increase resilience. 
Microgrid uses and basic components are introduced with emphasis on ESS. The research 
scope is established to focus on gaining an initial understanding of improved resilience 
through increased ESS distribution levels. Subsequent chapters adopt a definition of 
resilience, select a combination of resilience measures, implement a resilience analysis 
process, and simulate hazards on the different ESS configurations. The quintuple ESS 
microgrid simulation model is found to achieve the most favorable resilience results, 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review begins with the adoption of an IE behavior perspective and 
concludes with the selection of a microgrid resilience measure combination. A time-
domain frames the evaluation of microgrid resilience definitions. These definitions 
originate from both academic research labs and U.S. government organizations. Gaps and 
inconsistencies amongst existing definitions drive the synthesis of a purposed resilience 
definition for the DOD installation context. This definition includes both fundamental 
behavior characteristics  and explicit definitions of capability in a projected operating 
environment. This improved resilience definition guides the review of existing resilience 
measures through a matrix of desirable resilience qualities. Both a resilience behavior and 
a capability orientation invoked the selection of the following resilience measures: 
1. Peterson’s MI (2019),  
2. Wang and Yodo’s θ (2016), and  
3. Van Broekhoven’s islanding time (2014).  
Sandia National Lab’s resilience analysis process (RAP) was adopted to 
incrementally evaluate microgrid models with different levels of ESS distributions. The 
proposed resilience definition, the selected resilience measures, and the adopted RAP 
facilitates the determination that increased ESS distribution leads to greater microgrid 
resilience. 
A. ENERGY RESILIENCE 
Before evaluating resilience measures, the definition of resilience in the context of 
microgrids must be established. The literature reviewed in this section begins with the 
adoption of an energy resilience perspective. This perspective is used to evaluate existing 
resilience definitions across different research institutions. Energy resilience definitions 
can be broken into two categories, including architecture-supporting and analysis-
supporting definitions. Architecture-supporting definitions focus on accurately defining 
the characteristic components of resilience behavior but lack quantifiable terms (Taft 2018; 
Widergren et al. 2018). Analysis-supporting definitions are conflated with reliability ; but, 
these analysis-supporting definitions incorporate quantifiable terms associated with a 
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resilience analysis process (RAP)  and measurable resilience properties  (Bruneau et al. 
2003) and dimensions. A top-down review of U.S. government organizations’ definitions 
of resilience starts from Title 10 U.S. Code and proceeds down to service-specific facility 
organizations such as NAVFAC. Past concerns with detailed definitions from subordinate 
organizations involved a shift from describing capability protection to fixating on loss 
prevention. These concerns motivated the synthesis of a proposed DOD installation 
microgrid resilience definition by combining Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s 
(PNNL’s) architecture-supporting grid resilience definition with an explicit definition of 
“capability” from Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). It 
should be noted that resilience and resiliency are often used interchangeably in the 
literature reviewed in this section. However, resilience is the predominantly used term and 
is used exclusively throughout this research. 
Below is a review and analysis of existing energy resilience definitions. 
1. Architecture-Supporting Grid Resilience Definitions 
Researchers from Sandia National Labs concluded, “Currently, no formal grid 
resilience definitions, metrics, or analysis methods have been universally accepted.”   In 
an electrical grid context, resilience has been defined multiple ways across different time 
phases centered on an incident (National Academies of Sciences [NAS] 2017). NAS (2017) 
identifies resilience functions surrounding an adverse event as “lessening the likelihood,” 
“limiting the impact,” “restoring power rapidly afterward,” and “learning from these 
experiences.” This time-domain of phases creates a framework for organizing different 
resilience group elements. Research from Taft (2018) uses the time domain to differentiate 
resilience from reliability and leverage stress-strain interactions for organizing resilience 
elements in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Resilience and Reliability Domains. Source: Taft (2018). 
The red dashed vertical line in Figure 4 defines the boundary between resilience 
and reliability elements as the start of an outage. This boundary narrows the scope of 
resilience by associating reliability as “a measure of behavior once resilience is broken.”  
Taft claims, “a perfectly resilient grid would not experience any outages.” Using “sustained 
outage,” as the conclusion of the resilience phase, increases the granularity of behaviors 
before and during failure. Although their behaviors are separated, resilience and reliability 
are interrelated. 
The relationship between resilience and reliability is not simple, and reliability 
measurements depend on some set of events that result in outages (Taft 2018). Resilience 
behavior precedes outages. Taft further explains, “resilience may improve reliability” but 
identifies the association of resilience with reliability measures as “key issues.” A key issue 
involves a resilience increase, which has a poor or even inverse correlation with a selected 
“reliability measure” (Taft 2018).  
The material science stress-strain behavior concept introduces resilience as a 
combination of two types of components. The conceptualization of grid resilience is 
depicted by the hierarchical chart displayed in Figure 5. 
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Grid resilience is a subsection of stress and strain components. The stress component of 
resilience includes a combination of two abilities “to avoid” and “to withstand.” The strain 
component of resilience involves a combination of abilities “to adapt to” and “to 
compensate for.” This graphic shows how grid resilience is formulated to comprise two 
components of stress and strains used to categorize four abilities that support a resilience 
definition.  
Figure 5. Grid Resilience Components 
Figure 5 shows the first component of grid resilience, stress, is defined as the ability 
to “avoid” or “withstand” an incident-imposed pressure. A grid architecture “avoid” 
example involves modularity and (de)coupling (Widergren et al. 2018). A grid architecture 
“withstand” example is redundancy (Widergren et al. 2018). The second component, 
strain—either elastic or inelastic—is defined as the ability to “adapt to” or “compensate 
for” specific conditions associated with an incident. A grid architecture strain example of 
“adapt to” is energy resource flexibility (Widergren et al. 2018). A grid architecture 
example of “compensate for” involves reconfiguration. A microgrid demonstrates resilient 
behavior, in stress and strain, to avoid and withstand, or adapt to and compensate for as it 
gracefully degrades. Therefore, stress and strain—as components of resilience—frame the 
defining characteristics of resilience.  
Resilience characteristics are the fundamental attributes of resilient behavior and 
should be the focus when designing for resilience. Isolating these intrinsic resilience 
characteristics is required to approach architectural issues (Widergren et al. 2018). 












resilience. Consequently, analysis-supporting resilience descriptions are reviewed in the 
following section and are accepted as resilience sensing properties. 
2. Analysis-Supporting Resilience Descriptions 
Additional properties and associated measurements have been conflated to 
represent resilience. However, they remain useful for sensing the effects of resilience. This 
rationalization is analogous to recognizing how a pressure differential can be used for 
determining the velocity of a flowing fluid using a pitot tube instrument (Britannica 2016). 
Although a pressure differential does not characterize flow velocity, it serves as a sensing 
property for measuring flow velocity. Similarly, this section rationalizes analysis-
supporting terms as resilience sensing properties and associates these properties to intrinsic 
resilience characteristics from the previous section.  
As resilience sensing properties, reliability measures can still be used to measure 
the effectiveness of isolated resilience across multiple configurations in a test or simulation 
environment. For example, failure of a resilient grid that adapts or compensates to degrade 
gracefully (e.g., the system does not shatter) may influence a reliability measure (e.g., 
decreasing repair time). Per Figure 4, resilient grid behavior occurs prior-to and during 
failure. Indications of resilience can be illuminated by evidence from investigating follow-
on phases. Analyzing the aftermath of an incident for resilience indications would need to 
be applied in a test environment where reliability contributors are held constant. Testing 
for resilience, using reliability measures, would require both verifying presence of resilient 
behavior and implementing controls to isolate a resilience characteristic as the only 
plausible contributor to an increase to a reliability measure. Taft (2018) uses stress and 
strain material behavior to separate grid resilience behavior characteristics into two 
separate components. 
Some examples of resilience sensing properties—robustness, rapidity, 
resourcefulness, and redundancy—were conceived as seismic-resilience properties 
(Bruneau et al. 2003) and were later renamed as resilience dimensions. These examples 
have been resolved as resilience sensing properties and are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Resilience Sensing Properties Categorized by Stress-Strain 











The strength of system, or its 
ability to prevent damage 
propagation through the system 
in the presence of disruptive 
event. 




The speed or rate at which a 
system could return to its 
original state or at least an 
acceptable level of functionality 






The level of capability in 
applying material (i.e., 
information, technological, 
physical) and human resources 






The extent to which carries by a 
system to minimize the 






These resilience sensing properties are associated with their corresponding stress 
and strain components in Table 1. Bruneau et al. (2003) explain, “resilience is commonly 
used to denote strength and flexibility.” These property descriptions support stress-strain 
behavior components using Table 1. This association is important for reinforcing the 
concept of stress and strain for defining resilience. Although these resilience sensing 
properties do not directly characterize resilience, they serve as a source of performance-
based indicators to monitor the achievement of an organization’s resilience goals discussed 
in Chapter I. 
3. U.S. Government Grid Resilience Definitions 
The review of U.S. government (USG) organizations’ definitions of grid resilience 
include 10 U.S. Code 10 § 101 (e)(8), The White House, DOD, and NAVFAC. Almost 
every USG organizations’ definitions incorporate terminology supporting the stress and 
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strain characteristic components of resilience from architecture-support grid resilience 
definitions in section 1. However, resilience definitions across these USG organizations 
lack consistent terminology and a standardized perspective of resilience as a capability. 
Variations in resilience terminology and capability-perspective are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. U.S. Government Resilience Definitions 
U.S. Government Resilience Definitions 
Source Definition 
Quoted Term 
10 U.S. Code 10 § 101 
(e)(8)  
The capability of a military installation to avoid, prepare 
for, minimize the effect of, adapt to, and recover from 
extreme weather events, or from anticipated or 
unanticipated changes in environmental conditions that 
do, or have the potential to, adversely affect the military 
installation or essential transportation, logistical, or other 
necessary resources outside of the military installation that 
is necessary in order to maintain, improve, or rapidly 




(The White House 2013) The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing 
conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from 
disruptions 
“Resilience” 
(DOD Facilities 2016) The ability to prepare for and recover from energy 
disruptions that impact mission assurance on military 
installations 
“Resilience” 
(NAVFAC 2017) The ability of a system to anticipate, resist, absorb, 
respond, adapt, and recover from a disturbance. Threats 
that may cause a disturbance include weather events, 
accidents, geo-magnetic storms, terrorism, fire, 
cyberattack, and the effects of climate change e.g., sea-
level rise. Energy resiliency will ensure DON installations 
have the ability to both prepare for and recover from 




Definitions listed in Table 2 indicate a lack of standardized resilience terminology 
and inconsistent perspectives impede both the traceability of definitions from subordinate 
to governing organizations. The DOD (2016) definition of resilience omits all the 
architecture-supporting resilience characteristics previously discussed in section 1. A 
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characteristic of the stress component, “withstand,” is explicitly incorporated by The White 
House (2013) and NAVFAC (2017). The strain component, the “adapt to” characteristic is 
incorporated by 10 U.S. Code 10 § 101 (e)(8), The White House (2013), and NAVFAC 
(2017).  
The highest governing document, 10 U.S. Code 10 § 101 (e)(8), is the only 
definition that refers to resilience as a capability. The perception of resilience as a positive-
oriented capability is diluted in the definition of subordinate organizations. The DOD 
(2016) definition includes “ability” but introduces “impact to mission assurance.” The term 
“impact to mission” can diverge efforts toward minimizing an unspecified, seemingly 
limitless, sources of impacts. In attempting to tie resilience further into the mission, 
NAVFAC P-602 guidance alters the perspective towards minimizing mission impact from 
an unconstrained number of “types of disturbances.”  Subordinate USG organizations do 
not maintain the perspective of resilience as a capability.  
This section showed how USG definitions of resilience partially maintain stress and 
strain resilience characteristics but with much variance. The variance in resilience 
definitions dilutes the emphasis on resilience as a capability. Resilience must be perceived 
as a positive-oriented capability where improvements are centered toward an increase in 
resilience. A negative-oriented disruption prevention effort leads to endless divergent 
improvement efforts toward multiple sources of loss. The value of perceiving resilience as 
a capability is further discussed in the subsequent subsection. 
4. Valuing Resilience as a Capability 
The value of perceiving resilience as capability is demonstrated by framing an 
aviation-industry concept of “minimum essential equipment.” This example involves 
tracing a tenant organization’s minimum essential power requirements to mission 
performance levels of required operational capabilities (ROCs) within their projected 
operational environment (POEs).  
Defining resilience using threats and minimizing their impact to mission, although 
important, leaves the DOD without a way to quantify readiness or mission losses due to 
power interruptions. Quantifying the impact of power interruptions on military “readiness” 
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sets military organizations apart from commercial sectors. Energy resilience is different 
between the military and commercial sectors due to how operational losses from power 
interruptions are measured. A commercial company can directly quantify impacts from 
power outages by compiling “business interruption” costs (Larson et al. 2019). Defining 
the value of resilience remains effective for the commercial industry because there is a 
dollar amount attributed to the losses. In an attempt to measure the impact of power losses 
monetarily like the commercial sector, the National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) has 
begun to compile contractor payroll, repair, and recovery costs associated with resolving 
power interruptions on military installations. NREL measured impact using site survey data 
at MCAS Miramar to quantify interruption costs using a customer damage function (CDF) 
(Giraldez et al. 2012). 
Additionally, the chief of naval operations (CNO) made a major change to the Navy 
Installation Emergency Management Program Instruction requiring “tenant commands to 
report their Mission Essential Functions (MEF) to their host installations” (OPNAV 2014). 
However, the DOD does not have a way to quantify readiness gaps or mission losses 
directly. Consequently, no standard for defining the value of resilience exists within the 
DOD. This concept of minimizing mission impact or readiness losses is not suitable for the 
DOD and requires reorientation as a capability.  
The term “mission capability” is prevalent across DOD acquisition and is 
embedded in the earliest stages of the system life cycle. The chairman of the joint chiefs of 
staff (CJCS) (JCIDS 2018) defines capability as “The ability to complete a task or execute 
a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance.” Different levels 
of power-dependent mission capabilities need to be established by the tenant organizations 
in managing power expectations between leadership from the installation to the tenant 
organizations. The OPNAV 3501 Instruction defines required operational capabilities 
(ROC) for each tenant U.S. Navy (USN) organization based on their projected environment 
(POE). These ROC/POE enclosures are generated by the organization’s requirements 
officer.  
Perceiving resilience as a capability requirement invokes tenant organizations to 
communicate minimum essential power levels required for continuing mission capability 
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levels. Eisenberg, Alderson and Templeton explain how DOD infrastructure planning and 
recovery can still not model the “loss resulting from interdependent failures across 
infrastructure” (2018). Resilience needs to remain focused on mission protection instead 
of fixating loss prevention to address readiness and mission capability. An aviation-
industry example conveys mission-oriented advantages of perceiving resilience as a 
capability. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) applies a relatable minimum-
essential requirements concept through a master minimum equipment list (MMEL) for 
certified aircraft. This MMEL accounts for required instruments and equipment associated 
with specific operational conditions. The National Air Transportation Association explains 
how aircraft operators can have minimum equipment list (MEL) subsets approved to 
account for specific instruments, equipment, or operational conditions. Operational 
conditions include both mission type and operating environment. The same concept used 
to determine if an aircraft is airworthy for a specific flight type can also communicate 
tenant organizations’ power-contingent mission capability levels to their DOD installation.  
Although specific missions vary among tenant organizations, generic mission 
performance levels can be established to convey mission capability to DOD installation 
commanders. An example of five generic categories of mission capability levels is paired 
with power requirements in Table 3, which shows how mission capability levels are traced 
to minimum essential power requirements.  





Full Mission Capability  100 KW  8 hours/day  none 




Asset Loss (Hazards Contained)  1 KW  24 hours/day  occasional 
Uncontained Hazards  0.5 KW  1 hours/day  none 
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The communication tool from Table 3 invokes resilience strain characteristics of 
“compensate for” and “adapt to.” Sandia National Labs (2017) uses “ensuring availability 
of power” as a high-level resilience goal example but does not suggest any interaction with 
these power’s receiving organizations. Coordinating tenant organization power 
requirements to achieve mission capability levels increases resilience where it matters 
most: the DOD tenant organizations.  
This aviation industry example explains the importance of perceiving resilience as 
a capability. Specifically, this example justifies embedding a detailed JCIDS definition of 
“capability” to improve the expectations behind a definition of grid resilience for DOD 
installations. Next, the proposed grid resilience definition codifies this approach. 
5. Proposed DOD Installation Grid Resilience Definition 
This section resolves different resilience definitions from the previous sections by 
synthesizing a specialized definition to manage expectations between an installation and 
tenant commands. This definition places DOD tenant organizations in the center of the 
resilience arena. This resilience definition may not be ideal across every application but 
remains sufficient for determining whether distributing ESS leads to increased resilience 
of microgrids on DOD installations. The following definition is used throughout the 
remainder of this research: 
DOD Installation Microgrid Resilience (proposed): The ability to avoid 
or withstand grid stress events by continuing to complete a task or execute 
a course of action under specific conditions and level of performance or 
else; to adapt to and compensate for resultant strains to minimize 
compromise via graceful degradation.  
This definition incorporates both the intrinsic stress and strain components of 
resilience from Taft’s (2018) definition and the JCIDS (2015) definition for capability. 
Embedding the JCIDS definition of “capability” communicates warfighter expectations to 
supporting organizations through a level of performance under specific conditions. A DOD 
installation is tasked with providing power to tenant organizations but needs to execute 
directed courses of action from the installation’s commander. “Executing courses of 
action” is essential for accommodating procedural resilience strategies that affect the 
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mission. This synthesized definition describes resilience as a required attribute and 
illuminates expectations using ROC/POE.  
This definition is most useful in an operational context for deterministically 
measuring microgrid resilience capabilities under specified conditions. Research in optimal 
BESS sizing identified that a probabilistic optimization problem formulation was more 
effective than a deterministic (performance-based). However, a deterministic approach 
serves the purpose as an initial approach during early design exploration where “benefits 
can still be derived by undertaking a deterministic approach.” The resilience analysis 
process developed by Sandia National Laboratory states, “resilience metrics should be 
based on the performance of power systems.”  This research utilizes the synthesized 
definition in an operational context and deterministic perspective for testing resilience 
improvements on microgrids.  
The reasoning for the synthesis of this DOD Installation Grid Resilience definition 
started with identifying that no universally accepted resilience definitions exist (Vugrin, 
Castillo and Silva-Monroy 2017). A stress and strain resilience concept categorized the 
intrinsic grid characteristics of resilience to keep the focus on architecture (Widergren et 
al. 2018). Stress-strain behavior and positive oriented objectives guided the review of U.S. 
government organizations’ resilience definitions. This review identified an opportunity to 
improve the focus on resilience as a capability for DOD organizations. An aviation-
industry example with minimum essential equipment demonstrated the feasibility of 
utilizing a positive-oriented capability focus. The proposed DOD Installation Grid 
Resilience definition is used as the application-specific definition for the remainder of this 
thesis.  
B. MICROGRID RESILIENCE MEASURE EVALUATION 
The DOD Installation Grid Resilience proposed definition set the framework for 
the goal-oriented measurement of resilience for microgrids on DOD installations. This 
subsection introduces Sandia National Lab’s resilience analysis process (RAP). This RAP 
was used to establish an example resilience goal for guiding the resilience measure 
evaluation. This guidance existing measure similarities influenced the selection of 
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resilience measure qualities. The most important resilience measure qualities are Tangible 
Static Measure, Captures Dynamic Behavior, and Stakeholder Impact. These qualities were 
used to evaluate ten different resilience measures across both academia and the DOD. No 
single resilience measure was assessed to sufficiently satisfy the three most important 
resilience measure qualities. A combination of three resilience measures was selected. The 
first resilience measure selected was Dr. Van Broekhoven’s “Islandinging Time” (2012) to 
suffice a Tangible Static Measure quality. The second resilience measure selected was Dr. 
Wang’s Theta, θ, (2016) to suffice Captures Dynamic Behavior’s quality. Lastly, 
Peterson’s Mission Impact (MI) (2019) was selected based on the quality of Regards 
Stakeholder Impact.  
1. Goal-Oriented Resilience 
Some of the aforementioned candidate resilience measures are reliability measures 
and seemingly conflate resilience with reliability as “a measure of behavior once resilience 
is broken.”  This entanglement is resolved by identifying reliability measures as resilience 
sensing properties. Reliability measures can be instrumented at the functional boundary of 
the system to measure net resilience increases. “Availability” is an example of a reliability 
measurement used as a resilient sensing property for measuring a system’s resilience. 
Reliability measures, or other resilience sensing properties, may be used to measure the 
benefit of resilience improvements. This maintains the resilience characteristics, which 
architecture strives to define and leverages the relationships with reliability measures to 
quantify resilience (Taft 2018). This section conveys how many researchers rely on 
performance-based measures to assess resilience.  
Mission capability of tenant organizations is where resilience performance should 
matter for DOD Installations. Performance-based measurements of resilience are 
quantifiable and should be used to define specific high-level resilience goals (Vugrin, 
Castillo and Silva-Monroy 2017). Sandia National Lab’s RAP associates resilience with 
“ensuring power availability.” Their RAP is shown in Figure 6. 
28 
 
Figure 6. Sandia National Lab’s RAP. Source: Vugrin, Castillo, and 
Silva-Monroy (2017). 
Figure 6 shows the first step in the RAP process is to “Define Resilience Goals.” 
Setting resilience goals orients the efforts toward responding to a “capability need.” The 
following goal is an example of a military installation resilience goal:  
Military Installation Resilience Goal (example): To sustain command 
prioritized mission capability levels of military tenant organizations by 
continuing to meet their minimum essential power availability requirements 
for each time period. 
This installation goal not only sets a performance-based measurement but also instruments 
the measurement to military missions. Mission capability levels define this resilience 
analysis goal. This connection requires DOD organizations to communicate minimum 
essential power requirements to achieve their mission capability levels based on their ROC/
POE. This RAP justified the introduction of a resilience goal to guide the resilience 
measure evaluations. The remaining steps of the RAP are discussed in Chapter III. 
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2. Desirable Resilience Measure Qualities 
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) conducted a study on electricity systems 
resilience and indicated that no generally agreed-upon metrics are in wide use (2017). 
Resilience measures have been compiled across multiple sources based on their connection 
with microgrid applications or traceability to military installation requirements. Several 
desirable resilience measure qualities were selected based on their plausible influence on 
tenant DOD organizations’ mission capability levels. 
Objective orientation defines the first quality. This quality is anticipated to have a 
propensity for measurement for establishing a performance standard focused on a 
capability. A measure oriented for performance increases with improvements is more 
associable with a capability.  
Tangible Static Measure is the next resilience measure quality. This quality was 
defined as the basis for assessing a capability need leading to procurement . 
Captures Dynamic Behavior was identified as an important quality based on 
measuring resilience improvements by capturing the vanishing rate of a performance-based 
measure such as mission capability. Performance needs to be sustained to buy operational 
decision-makers time for selecting a new course of action (COA). This is why systems 
need to be designed to slow the collapse rate to afford leadership time to cope with the 
changing environment. A system that shatters or collapses quickly is less resilient than one 
that degrades gracefully. This quality is consistent with the stress-strain behavior of 
microgrid resilience.  
A common theme of mission-focused resilience research approaches is 
acknowledging dependencies and interdependencies required for normal operation (Petit 
et al. 2015). Regards stakeholder impact represents this connection to stakeholders such as 
DOD tenant organizations. This quality is used to illuminate resilience measures 
performance beyond standard interruptions and outage durations.  
Interruption Frequency and Interruption Duration were adopted as resilience 
measure qualities based on a prevalent connection to power-grid outages. Pervasive power-
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grid measures associated with these qualities are the System Average Interruption 
Frequency Index (SAIFI) and System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI).  
Most duration resilience measures utilize Monte Carlo Simulations (MCS) to 
leverage the time domain for representing depletion characteristics of energy storage 
systems and other time-based characteristics (degradation, recovery) (Xu and Singh 2014). 
Time-Period Indexed quality illuminates resilience measures that can leverage the time-
domain.  
These qualities are anticipated to be highly influential in attaining the resilience 
goal for the military installation context. These several qualities are used to evaluate the 
candidate resilience measures in the following section. 
3. Candidate Resilience Measures 
This subsection utilizes the resilience measure qualities for evaluating several 
candidate resilience measures across academic research and U.S. government 
organizations. This evaluation involved qualitatively assessing each candidate resilience 
measure for strengths or weaknesses in each resilience measure quality. These qualities are 
columned-across the top, and while the candidate resilience measures are rowed-down the 




Figure 7. Resilience Measure Quality Matrix 
As a resilience sensing property measures from Peterson (2019) and Petit (2015), 
Mission Impact focuses on capturing impact to the stakeholders throughout an interruption. 
Xu (2016) incorporates probabilistic surge factors and associated frequency of and duration 
of an interruption. Van Broekhoven et al. (2012) have the only sufficiently tangible static 
measure, Islanding Time, that directly traces to installation survivability requirements. 
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Finally, θ is the only candidate resilience measure that sufficiently captures dynamic 
behavior surrounding a grid event. 
The “Impact” measure was developed from an emergency management approach 
to address an organization’s dependency on a given resource during an adverse event. 
Time-domain dependency characterized the effects of losing this resource on its essential 
functions (Petit, Wallace and Phillips 2014). This dependency approach is depicted by 
plotting an organization’s specific Impact—as a percentage of the specific organization’s 
functionality loss—against time surrounding a disruption in a supplied resource. Impact 
was plotted during an event using a Dependency Curve based on the following three types 
of info (Petit, Wallace and Phillips 2014):  
1. Events and procedures in place 
2. Times and durations 
3. Amount of degradation 
The Dependency Curve suggests how electrical power Impacts influence the 
availability of other resources or functions such as water, wastewater, communications, 
and Information Technology. These Impact relationships are depicted using a Dependency 
Dashboard shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Dependency Dashboard Overview. Source: Petit, Wallace, 
and Phillips (2014). 
Figure 8 shows how 100% electrical power resource impact precedes the substantial 
impact increase to the water resource. The dependency curve and dashboard are useful for 
showing how a loss of a resource may disrupt a dependent organization’s function in time. 
Plotting Impact over time is sufficient for depicting responses throughout tested scenarios 
(Petit, Wallace and Phillips 2014). The Impact comparison plotting from Dependency 
Dashboard provided a useful means to associate microgrid performance to different 
resources or mission capability levels.  
This resilience measure’s intended purpose is to provide emergency management 
and business continuity stakeholders rapid feedback from simulating unique emergency 
action procedures (Petit, Wallace and Phillips 2014).   
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This Impact resilience measure lacks absolute units and does not provide a means 
for increasing the level of abstraction. Variations in repair times may pose cascading 
responses, which are not accounted for in this model. The lack of absolute units allows for 
an uncontrolled variation in Impact among different organizations or situations. Increasing 
the abstraction level would be required for defining system architecture, including 
functions across different emergency scenarios. Impact needs to be generalized for 
widespread use before it can be widely adopted. 
Expected Lifetime Mission Impact (ELMI) is a generalized measure used for 
quantifying losses to an organization based on the importance and duration of power 
interruption (Peterson 2019). This resilience measure is more generic than Impact and is 
useful beyond a specific procedure (Petit, Wallace and Phillips 2014). ELMI captures the 
interruption’s time-duration for assessing resilience in different scenarios on the Monterey 
Microgrid Simulation Model (Peterson 2019). MI can be used to model Peterson’s 
“function of the amount of load shed, time of the load shedding, and facility which had 
unmet demand” (2019). This resilience measure provides relative comparisons but lacks 
absolute values to trace back to military installation requirements. ELMI does not capture 
impact due to the frequency of interruption. An organization with ten 1-minute power 
interruptions ranks an ELMI equivalent to receiving one 10-minute power interruption. 
MDI. MI can be improved to a standardized measure if attributed values are based upon 
MDI.  
Mission Dependency Index (MDI) was defined by Navy Installations Command 
(CNIC) for evaluating interdependent infrastructure systems on U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD) military installations (CNIC 2018). This purpose is driven by the need to 
measure worst-case disruptions—through simulation models—to support installation 
decision making. The approach pivots the focus from protecting a single infrastructure to 
protecting the system that interacts with multiple infrastructures for operational resilience 
(Eisenberg, Alderson and Templeton 2018). MDI relies on qualitative expert input to assess 
an overall MDI between 0 and 100 based on both mission intra-dependency (MDW) and 
inter-dependency (MDB) scores. Figure 9 shows how MDI increases due to increases in 
dependencies MDW and MDB. 
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Figure 9. Mission Dependency Index (MDI). Source Eisenberg, 
Alderson, and Templeton (2018).  
Figure 9 depicts how MDI is calculated using interruptability and interdependency. 
Intra-dependency is defined as comparing relocate-ability. Inter-dependency is defined as 
comparing replicability. The dependencies are generalized through a scoring system but 
rely on expert elicited survey responses to achieve categorized codes and values. The 
methods for collecting and compiling data to compute MDI remain ad hoc and are 
determined to be ineffective for measuring readiness (Eisenberg, Alderson and Templeton 
2018).  
MDI captures the interactions, dependencies, and impact of worst-case scenarios 
but is limited as a relative measure and does not capture resilient behavior’s stress-strain 
characteristics. Decision-makers need an absolute measure to base appropriations and 
operator resilient behaving systems that gracefully degrade and buy them time to pivot 
courses of action. Both losses and capabilities need to be associated with quantifiable 
measures to reach stakeholder acceptance. Specific behaviors need to be captured in the 
attacker-defender models to convey relevant behavior of grid-related consequences.  
Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) and Expected Energy Not Served (EENS) are two 
resilience sensing properties applied to a compressed air energy storage system (CAES) 
(Xu and Singh 2014). The first was the loss of load, where energy storage could reduce 
unserved energy. The second was the economic advantage of selling power during high-
peak times (Xu and Singh 2014). These two factors were used to assess a smart-grid 
communication and control architecture’s performance through a load aggregator. This 
research concluded that the operation strategy, affected by load aggregator, improved ESS 
utilization, better manage renewable energy generation. This resilience assessment 
approach treated microgrid power distribution as transactional for a generic commercial 
36 
power market (Xu and Singh 2014). This method is agnostic to what the stored power is 
being used for; and, this method consequently has a loose connection to the mission. 
Although these metrics have very tangible units, they assume that stakeholders with larger 
energy requirements have a higher essential power priority.  
SAIDI and SAIFI measures averaged annually, set the reliability goal and 
connected the improvement to ESS sizing for a remote community. Aming et al.’s research 
utilized a Monte Carlo simulation to determine the expected life-cycle reliability 
improvements based on ESS storage duration capability (2007). An hourly time step was 
used to show how a 2-hour ESS capability reduced SAIDI from 1100minutes/customer/
year to 250–300minutes/customer/year averaged over a 20-year period. This research 
suggested further improvement could be obtained by introducing a strategy for shedding 
certain load types to shave demand peaks. ESS power and energy storage ratings 
determined projected reliability indices. SAIDI and SAIFI are centered on the interruption 
duration or frequency that defines them. These measures are not strongly tangible, and 
failures are diluted when averaged over a long period of time. Strong SAIDI and SAIFI 
results provide little resilience information about behaviors during low probability/ high-
impact events.  
The Energy Resilience measure was defined as a version of mission availability 
shown in  Table 4 . 
Table 4. Energy Resilience Equation. Source: Lord (2020).  
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The mission availability asterisk in Table 4 emphasizes a representation of a 
mission-required load. This additional guidance suggests a slightly improved connection 
to stakeholder impact compared to SAIDI. This measure is positive-objective oriented. 
Similar to SAIDI and SAIFI, this measure shares a neutral rating as a tangible measure 
based on a significant number of time periods required to achieve a significant meaning. 
Like SAIDI and SAIFI, averaging over these large time periods dilutes any poor resilience 
performance during high-impact events. This Energy Resilience value would hold little 
value characterizing the resilient performance during a low-probability/ high-impact event. 
A system, which can achieve high availability—even mission connected availability—does 
not necessarily have requisite resilience to a high-impact event.  
Grid resilience is predominately associated with low probability, high-consequence 
disruptions. SAIDI, SAIFI, and Energy Resilience measures do not capture stakeholder 
impact associated with resilient behavior in response to high impact events. Microgrids 
with high values for SAIDI, SAIFI, and Energy Resilience could remain vulnerable during 
high-impact events while proficient operational performance data dilute their measures 
under normal conditions associated with reliability. Unlike Impact, ELMI, and MDI, 
SAIDI, SAIFI, and Energy Resilience do not capture stakeholder impact in their current 
form. 
“Islanding Time” measures resilience capability expectations as a positive, tangible 
static measure (S. Van Broekhoven, N. Judson et al. 2012). Islanding time—developed to 
inform ESS investments—conforms to the military installation survivability requirement 
per UFC 3–540-1. This conformance provides clear cost justifications for an absolute, 
verifiable, resilience capability. Islanding Time does not capture dependencies within the 
infrastructure, different mission priorities, or varying demand requirements. This measure 
is positive objective oriented as a single static mission of “maximizing islanding time” (S. 
Van Broekhoven, N. Judson et al. 2012). Maximizing only islanding time is hyper-focused 
on endurance and may conflict with a mission strategy and does not account for stakeholder 
impact, power interruptions, or other factors supporting mission capability. Islanding Time 
met its intended purpose for generating a cost-benefit analysis of  ESS investment based 
on ancillary services as a means to offset energy storage costs. This measure conveyed how 
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Net Present Value (NPV) falls below zero for Islandinging Time durations beyond seven 
days (Van Broekhoven et al. 2012). Despite significant gaps related to frequency, mission 
dependency, and strategy, this measure highlights survivability as a critical component to 
DOD installation resilience.  
θ was designed for an iterative improvement scheme where resilience 
improvements are predicated by analyzing results from baseline performance of a system 
faced with disruptions. This improvement scheme is shown in Figure 10 
 
Figure 10. Design Resilience to Improve System Performance. 
Source: Wang and Yodo (2016). 
The θ from Figure 10 relies on the premise of state-based performance levels and 
time-periods by measuring the change in system performance change through a disruptive 
event. The original state and original time of the disruptive event mark this angle’s origin 
and is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. θ Measuring Unreliability Profile. Source: Wang and Yodo 
(2016). 
Figure 11 depicts three different performance degradation profiles labeled u1 
through u3. The first profile, u1, measures a θ of 0-degrees from the vertical axis and 
represents the most volatile performance drop. The third profile, u3, shows measures a 
significantly larger θ-angle and is associated with more docile behavior and a performance 
drop that is less volatile. θ is the only candidate resilience measure that quantitatively 
captures this dynamic behavior for assessing a microgrid’s resilience surrounding a 
disruptive event. Capturing dynamic behavior during a low-probability high-impact 
disruption is the crux of measuring resilient behavior. θ captures the intrinsic characteristics 
of resilience that no existing measures can. However, θ blatantly lacks both a tangible static 
measure and an ability to address stakeholder impact. An example system with an 
unchanged 0% performance level throughout disruptive events would measure a θ of 90-
degrees and would appear to be resilient to disruptive events. Although θ captures 
sufficiently captures resilient behavior better than any other candidate measures, it’s 
deficiencies as a tangible measure and ability to account for stakeholder impact limits this 
measure from being a sufficient resilience measure.  
 
40 
No single resilience measure was assessed to sufficiently satisfy the three most 
important resilience measure qualities. Consequently, a combination of three resilience 
measures was selected. Van Broekhoven et al.’s “Islanding Time” (2012) suffices a 
tangible static measure’s quality for quantifying resilience as a capability. Peterson’s 
Mission Impact (MI) (2019) sufficiently regards stakeholder impact during hazard 
scenarios. Most importantly, Wang and Yodo’s θ (2016) captures the dampening of volatile 
performance losses for measuring microgrid resilience.  
Even when a highly durable and reliable system reaches its breaking point, the 
velocity at which that system collapses or shatters diminishes the warfighters’ ability to 
pivot to a different course of action. This rapid change is captured by θ. Stress behaviors 
are required to avoid and withstand IEs. Strain behaviors are required to adapt and 
compensate for facilitating graceful degradation. A system that shatters or collapse faster 
than the warfighter can cope with the change will have adverse consequences for the 
mission and the assets involved.  
There is an aspect of the time-domain of resilience that was not obtained during 
this literature review. The time-domain presented at the beginning of this section did not 
specify a time-step. Definitions did not specify time intervals. Candidate resilience 
measures varied from seconds (including Impact) and hours (including ELMI, EENS) to 
years (including SAIDI, SAIFI). Of the literature reviewed, the closest discussion of time-
steps involved battery energy and power ratings to complement ESS discharge strategy 
with an uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Time-steps pose an unexplored gap in how 
resilience is observed. This gap may be susceptible to aliasing errors limited by data 
sampling. In the context of DOD installation resilience, seemingly intra-microsecond 
resilience improvements may induce intraday or intra-week issues or vice versa.  
This concept of intra-timestep resilience should be regarded during resilience 
improvement efforts. Intra-timestep boundaries illuminate tradeoffs of resilience 
improvements between different levels of timeframes. An intra-microsecond to intraday 
resilience tradeoff example involves limiting the energy extraction of a variable speed wind 
turbine to 75% extraction and modulating the remaining 25% for power system stability 
enhancement. This approach improved intra-microsecond resilience through grid stability 
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but reduced the overall energy captured to support intraday or intra-week resilience. 
Results from the remainder of this thesis utilize an hourly timestep based on identical 
building, solar, generator, ESS, and other microgrid data used to construct the previous 
NPS Microgrid Simulation Model  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
This literature review started with the incorporation of a time-domain to frame a 
perspective for evaluating definitions of resilience. Stress and strain concepts from 
architecture-supporting resilience definitions proved difficult to quantify and carried into 
analysis-supporting resilience descriptions. Descriptions of reliability were rejected as 
fundamental definitions of resilience but accepted as sources to originate performance-
based resilience measures. 
These characteristics and capability guided a top-down review of U.S. government 
definitions of resilience as definitions from subordinate organizations expanded on the 
resilience definition details. Detail definitions inverted resilience from a positive capability 
to a negative mitigation effort. A stress and strain characteristics and JCIDS’s explicit 
definition of capability supported the synthesis of a new detailed definition of DOD 
Installation Grid Resilience. This new definition posed measurement obstacles resolved 
through resilience sensing properties. Resilience sensing properties, performance-based 
parameters were used to illuminate resilient behavior and set resilience goals following 
Sandia National Lab’s RAP. An example DOD installation resilience goal and resilience 
measure qualities from Table 2 guided the evaluation of candidate resilience measures. 
Insufficiencies in capturing resilience behavior, characterized by dynamic performance 
changes for low-probability/ high-impact events, drove the synthesis of a new resilience 
measure. Both resilience behavior characteristics and capability orientation invoked the 
selection of resilience measures Peterson’s MI (2019), Wang and Yodo’s θ (2016), and 
Van Broekhoven’s islanding time (2014). The next section, Methodology, utilizes the 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This section utilizes the proposed microgrid resilience definition, resilience 
measures and resilience analysis process described in Chapter II to formulate a method for 
testing microgrid resilience improvements. The research presented in this thesis was 
conducted using the “analysis thesis” and “design thesis” methods. The analysis portion is 
organized based on a modified version of Sandia National Lab’s resilience analysis process 
(RAP), conducting improvement evaluations shown in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12. Resilience Analysis Process (RAP). Source: Vugrin, 
Castillo, and Silva-Monroy (2017).  




1. Define Resilience Goals 
2. Define Consequence Categories & Resilience Metrics 
3. Characterize Hazards 
4. Determine Level of Disruption 
5. Collect Data via System Model 
6. Calculate Consequences & Resilience Metrics 
7. Evaluate System Improvements 
Steps 1–3 encompass the organization’s resilience goal, performance-based 
measure, and load consumption. Step 4 of the RAP, Determine Level of Disruption, 
contains the design portion. A Network Flow formulation framed the design of an 
improved microgrid simulation model for testing different energy storage system 
quantities. MI defined the consequence of a power outage for driving the objective function 
and allowing initial comparison against the published MATLAB-based NPS Monterey 
microgrid simulation model. This improved microgrid simulation model serves as the 
platform for testing microgrids with different levels of energy storage distributions. This 
design and analysis combination was selected as the approach for testing whether 
distributing energy storage increases microgrid resilience. These seven RAP steps define 
the following seven sections. 
A. STEP-1: DEFINE RESILIENCE GOALS 
This section covers the “Define Resilience Goals” from the RAP. System 
improvement evaluation frames the focus for establishing a high-level resilience goal. The 
details from this RAP step were used to evaluate the DOD Installation resilience goal.  
The RAP can be implemented to assess the resilience of a power system to a 
previous historical event or evaluate system improvements. This thesis utilizes the RAP 
for evaluating system improvements specific to testing whether distributing ESS leads to 
greater resilience in microgrids on DOD Installations. For evaluating improvements, a 
high-level resilience goal needs to address system specifications and key stakeholders. 
Systems specifications addressed in this high-level resilience goal include 
command prioritization, mission capability, environment context, and a relevant time-
period. Command prioritization invokes a requirement for selecting which installation’s 
tenant organization needs its mission capability levels met over the other. Mission 
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capability implies collaboration with each tenant organization for quantifying their ability 
to meet their mission objectives as a percentage of what they could otherwise achieve with 
full power availability. Minimum essential power availability further refines a tenant 
organization’s power requirements for an applicable time-period. The environment context 
illuminates the projected operating environment. The projected operating environment 
needs to include both low and high-impact events. The time-period for this thesis is limited 
to the hourly timestep across a single operational day. These details are incorporated into 
the following resilience goal: 
Resilience Goal (example): To sustain daily command prioritized mission 
capability levels of the installation’s tenant organizations by steadily 
continuing to meet their hourly minimum essential power availability 
requirements during low and high impact events. 
This resilience goal concludes Step 1 of the RAP and provides the foundation for 
defining consequence categories and resilience metrics discussed in the next section. 
B. STEP-2: DEFINE CONSEQUENCE CATEGORIES AND RESILIENCE 
METRICS  
Consequence categories are used to organize resilience metrics defined in Step 2 of 
the RAP. This RAP step is used to categorize selected consequences and associate the 
selected resilience measures with the methodology from this step. 
Per the RAP, there are two types of consequence categories and are named direct 
and indirect. Examples of direct consequence categories include electrical service, 
restoration, monetary. Examples of indirect categories involve community function, 
monetary, and other critical assets. The monetary consequence category can be linked to 
direct monetary resilience measures such as loss of revenue or repair damages or indirect 
resilience measures like loss of assets or perishables and business interruption costs. The 
three resilience measures selected for this RAP are categorized in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Consequence Types and Categories with Resilience Measure 
Type Category Resilience Measure 
Indirect Organizational 
Function 




Direct Electrical Service Survival Time 
 
Modified categories and resilience measures are shown in Table 5 include both a 
capability orientation and dynamic measure additions. The capability orientation involves 
reorganizing the abstract units from Peterson’s Mission Impact (2019) to a percentage of 
the best-case to the worst-case Mission Impact values. For example, an unaffected 
microgrid has 0 MI units and achieves 100% mission capability. Conversely, a completely 
affected system would have a finite calculatable maximum MI unit corresponding to 0% 
mission capability. Dynamic Electrical Service is a dynamic measure addition that utilizes 
the θg resilience measure to capture the rate at which electrical services come offline. 
Average θ Glideslope, θg, is a modified version of Wang and Yodo’s θ  (2016) and reorients 
the angle in performance change to a horizontal reference. θg is composed by Δp, measured 
by an initial performance level, p1 at an initial time, t1, and, the lowest performance level, 





Figure 13. θ (glideslope), θg, Composition Diagram 
Figure 13 shows how the arctangent of a performance drop, Δp, over the elapsed 
time periods, Δt is used to compose θg in degrees from a horizontal reference. A horizontal 
reference provides a horizon as an intuitive indicator for stability. A shallow glideslope for 
θg intuitively indicated docile degradations where a steep θg can be inferred that system 
performance levels are aggressively degrading. Demonstrative changes in performance are 
spanned across different transition periods shown in Table 6. 


















1  100% 0% 0.0001 89.99 
2  100% 0% 5 11 
3  100% 0% 20 2.9 
4  100% 100% 1 0 
5  100% 50% 1 27 
6  100% 50% 5 6 
7  50% 50% 1 0 




Table 6 shows eight examples exhibiting different performance changes, Δp, 
measured by initial performance level, lowest performance level, and degrade time, Δt. 
Examples 1–3 show how equivalent performance drops, = Δp, with increasing degrade 
time, + Δt, results in a shallow glideslope, -θg. Conversely, a theoretically rapid, - Δt,   
performance drop, +Δp,  from 100% to 0% results in a volatile glideslope, θg, of ~90 
degrees. Examples 4–8 show smaller drop and lower start combinations of Δp and Δt that 
illuminate the unique dynamic utility of θg. For fluctuating performance degrades, an 
average θg is measured from each θg starting from the initiating hazard through the last 
survivable period. An example of system performance showing different average θg values 
between an immediate and a delayed performance drop is shown in Figure 14. 
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The solid black lines represent the plot of θg. The magenta dots depict relevant points 
contributing to the average θg. The solid black lines represent the plot of θg. The Immediate 
Performance drop has a max θg of -26.6 deg and occurs in period 2. The Delayed 
Performance Drop has a max θg of -8.1 deg and occurs later in period 7. 
Figure 14. Average θg Comparison between Immediate and Delayed 
Mission Capability Decrease.  
Figure 14 shows how average θg. is influenced by the slope of the performance drop 
and the proximity to the initiating event. θg naturally decreases as the number of periods 
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increases from the initial period. The last period included in the average θg is the settled 
bottom steady-state performance level known as the last survivable period. The last 
survivable period also influences the third and final resilience measure 
Islanding Time is the final resilience measure selected for this RAP and captures 
the quantifiable capability of microgrid performance (Van Broekhoven et al. 2012). This 
Islanding Time measurement captures the quantifiable duration a microgrid can survive 
from the initiating event, t1, until a final time. A final time, tf, represents the time when a 
system performance settles below a minimum threshold. This minimum performance 
threshold is usually 0% performance level and can be rationalized as a system’s time-of-
death. This survivability measure aligns with DOD energy security expectations discussed 
in requirements from military installations previously discussed in Chapter I.  
This 2nd RAP step utilized the thesis microgrid resilience goal to select three 
resilience measures. Capability-oriented Mission Impact connected power availability to 
the organization. Average θg captured the priority of stability for steadily continuing to 
provide power. Finally, islanding time captured the sustain portion to measure how long a 
microgrid can survive after an IE. These selected resilience measures are instrumented for 
testing whether distributing ESS results in increased resilience in DOD installation 
microgrids. Resilience testing was driven by low and high impact events informed by 
hazards from the following section. 
C. STEP-3: CHARACTERIZE HAZARDS  
The third RAP step involves “specification of hazards of concern (e.g., hurricane, 
cyber-attack, etc.).”  Vugrin et al. further explain that the hazards are typically original 
from a prioritized list of stakeholders’ concerns (2017). It is incumbent upon the microgrid 
systems engineer to reference FEMA and other emergency data sources for factors specific 
to their microgrid environment. Some of their factors that affect which hazards apply are 
provided in the following list : 
1. Likelihood the hazard will be realized 
2. Likelihood that severe consequences are realized 
3. Strategic priorities 
4. Resources available for performing the analysis 
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Modifications from the original RAP involve prioritizing resources available for 
managing this analysis’s scope and, ultimately, the thesis. Resources available are the most 
limiting factor for affecting this thesis. Simple and straightforward hazard conditions 
presented an aptitude for representation through simulation. This aptitude for simulation 
drove the selection of hazard categories. Plausible straightforward representations 
encompass point failures, point failures with radii, and straight destructive paths. 
These representations were compared against relevant internal and external 
Powerplant Safety Analyses (PSA) hazard categories. Point failures simulations can be 
used to represent equipment failure, internal fires, and internal flooding hazard categories. 
The point failure simulation representation is implemented by changing the 
microgrid component’s operational state at a specific time during the simulation period on 
a microgrid. Representing multiple failures in the same location is represented by 
increasing the represented area of destruction. 
A point failure with destruction radius can be used to represent the following 
categories: airplane crashes, explosions, expansive flooding, or fire hazard. Regardless of 
the cause or physical interactions during these hazards, the extent of the destruction 
boundary can still be represented as a point radius. This extent of the destruction is 
represented using the red-shaded area on a physical microgrid layout in  Figure 15. 
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An overhead view of the microgrid layout show which microgrid components, represented 
by labeled squares, are covered by the point radius hazard representation. The red-shaded 
area shows six microgrid components are affected by this point radius hazard. 
Figure 15. Point Failure with Destruction Radius Hazard 
Representation.  
The red-shaded destruction represents the area damaged in Figure 15 represents a 
boundary for the extent of destruction from a typical explosion. This destruction boundary 
is relatable to an explosion’s blast radius for both a typical car bomb and a truck bomb 
shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Blast Analyses of a High School for a Typical Car Bomb 
and Large Truck Bomb. Adapted from FEMA (n.d.). 
Figure 16 shows how a truck bomb could impact a component within a 1,200-meter 
radius. Flooding or wildfire damage could also be represented using a point radius. 
However, destruction boundaries from flooding or fire could take on another shape 
dependent on the installation’s physical environment and the nature of the specific hazard 
conditions. This type of boundary is captured in the straight destructive path simulation 
and can represent forest fires, floods, seismic events, and tornado hazard categories. These 
destructive paths can extend across the entire physical layout of the microgrid. This path is 
represented using a blue hurricane icon, a blue arrow from left to right, and a red-shaded 




Figure 17. Straight Destructive Path Representation of a Tornado Path 
Across a Microgrid 
The red-shaded destructive path in Figure 17 has an associated width dependent on 
parameters from the hazard to be represented. A tornado hazard reference from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (n.d.) characterizes typical tornados with the 
following parameters: 
1. Average width: 300–500meters 
2. Average path length: 26 miles 
3. Funnel cloud travel speed: 10–50mph  
A systems designer applying this method may reference these types of dimensions 
for representing the destructive path of a simulated tornado.  
The disturbance caused by point failure, point failure with radius, and destructive 
path hazard representations provides justification for failing certain microgrid 
component(s) during a simulation. The number of hazards selected influences the amount 
of time required to formulate and test different hazard scenarios. To control the resilience 
analysis scope, the user should select hazards based on the priority of the stakeholder’s top 
hazard concerns.  
This RAP step of characterizing hazards involved associating plausible simulation 
representations with relevant hazard categories on a physical microgrid. A method for 
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illustrating certain hazards was discussed to justify affected components during a resilience 
simulation. The functional state was introduced as the method to connect the impact of 
hazard representations to the functionality of affected nodes during a microgrid simulation. 
A method for connecting the hazard to the simulation involves the development of the 
hazard scenario. The hazard scenarios are further discussed in the next section for 
determining the level of disruption during microgrid stress events.  
D. STEP-4: DETERMINE LEVEL OF DISRUPTION 
The purpose of this step is to “…specify the level of damage or stress that grid 
assets are anticipated to suffer under the specified hazard scenarios.” This section requires 
stakeholder-approved hazard parameters for deriving hazard scenarios with anticipated 
physical damage and quantified disruption. Modifications to the original RAP step hazard 
scenarios include both a simplified damage representation and a limited scope of disruption 
quantification. Stakeholder concerns should influence the selection of hazards; and, the 
agreement of relevant parameters should inform germane hazard scenarios. An example 




Table 7. Example Stakeholder-Approved Hazards of Concern with 
Associated  Scenario Examples with Associated Parameters 
Stakeholder 
Hazards of 











n/a Point Failure 
Equipment 
Failure 
ESS fails at time t. 
Single 
component 
n/a Point Failure 
Equipment 
Failure 




n/a Point Failure 
Explosion 
Truck bomb explodes 
at Component X at 
time t 
Blast radius 1 mile Point with Radius 
Tornado 
Components X 
through n are 
destroyed by a 
tornado passing at 
time t. 
Path width 0.1 miles 
Destructive path 






through n are engulfed 
in a forest fire on the 
southern border. 
Path width 15 miles 





The hazards of concern from Table 7 inform the representative hazard scenario, 
associated parameters, and representation method. As a subset of the scenarios, specific 
microgrid stress test events can be developed from component x to component n.  
Additional simplifications to hazard scenarios include both a binary perspective on 
failure and omission of component repair or recovery. A failed component or connection 
is assumed to be a complete failure and modeled as inoperable for the remainder of the 
simulation. An example implementation of a binary failed generator is depicted on a 
physical diagram of a microgrid in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Example Failed Microgrid State for Generator #1 
The example in Figure 18 shows how a generator, G1, fails at time, t = 4. This time 
of binary failure is linked to the microgrid state diagram. A microgrid state diagram 
represents the physical states of microgrid components throughout each simulation. A 
microgrid state diagram representing this failed generator is shown in Figure 19.  
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The state diagram is for a microgrid simulation with a failed Generator #1 at Time, t = 4 
hours. B1_GEN1 and Timestep (hour) are the significant columns. Failure is indicated by 
a null value for the associated timestep (hour). The dark gray portion covers the states of 
additional microgrid components outside this Generator #1 example. 
Figure 19. Example Microgrid State Diagram for Failed Generator #1 
at Time, t = 4 hours.  
The fourth hour timestep in Figure 19 shows how the generator’s state changes 
from an operational state of 1 to a failed state of 0. Due to this generator failure, overall 
energy deficiencies on the microgrid are propagated through simulation to influence 
whether certain critical loads are met. 
Stakeholder input is required to appreciate the level of disruption caused by power 
outages. Mission impact (MI) is a simple measure to prioritize the importance of each 
facility and quantify hourly disruption. An example MI table is shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20. MI Example: Summary of Critical Loads and Facility MI. 
Source: Peterson (2019). 
Stakeholder input is required to determine the hourly MI shown in Figure 20. This 
hourly MI is a simple and direct method for quantifying a stakeholder-concurred level of 
disruption. Since MI is a relative measure, all the stakeholders involved should be made 
aware of other facilities’ MI values to prevent miscommunicated priorities. Baseline values 
for MI could be gleaned from a facility’s MDI  (CNIC 2018). However, to remain 
compatible with Peterson’s MI values between 0–200, MDI’s 0–100 scale must be 
multiplied by two for MI to align with Peterson’s original 0–200 scale in this thesis. 
Step 4: Determining the level of disruption used stakeholder provided hazards of 
concern to develop representative scenarios. Destruction boundaries, developed from 
hazard parameters, identified physically damaged microgrid components. A microgrid 
state diagram was used to connect the damaged microgrid components to their failed state 
during the simulation. Finally, stakeholder informed MI values quantified the duration-
based disruption and implied mission priority for each facility. In the next section, the 
microgrid simulation utilizes microgrid components’ operational states to determine the 
resultant disruptions due to energy deficiencies. The hazard scenarios, microgrid state 
diagram, and MI impact table developed in this section influence the next section’s 
microgrid simulation model. 
This section answered how to organize the implementation of hazard simulations. 
Nominal hazard dimensions were informed by online handbooks. Additional hazard 
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attributes could include interactions specific to a threat, posture, or installation. These 
interactions these hazard details are beyond the scope of this research. 
E. STEP-5: COLLECT DATA VIA SYSTEM MODEL  
This step involves the collection of consequence data from either system models or 
historical events. System models are more appropriate for testing different levels of ESS 
distribution when historical data does not apply. Outage Management Systems (OMS) data 
provide a useful source for resilience analysis. However, historical data’s applicability 
becomes questionable when exploring either unprecedented microgrid configurations or 
forward-looking hazard scenarios. The structure and formulation of the microgrid 
simulation model are discussed in this section for energy consumption and then generation. 
After a basic model structure is explained, indices are introduced. Next, both system-
specified and data-informed parameters are explained and supported using brief parameter 
relationship equations to convey model behavior. The objective function is organized to 
minimize MI. Constraints are implemented using four different mechanisms to model 
energy flow throughout the microgrid and imitate realistic microgrid controller logic. This 
system model is required for simulating hazard scenarios, at an hourly timestep, throughout 
the 24-hour period. 
1. Model Structure 
Microgrid configurations can be subjected to hazard scenarios in a system 
simulation model. The following microgrid simulation model utilizes a network flow 
formulation to propagate energy deficiencies into a quantified level of disruption. The 
microgrid controller logic imitates the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Module . 
Hazard damaged microgrid components are simulated using nodes to influence 
electrical energy flow to facilities on an installation. These entities were represented as 
nodes and were characterized by electrical energy generated or consumed during each 
period. A network flow problem framed the simulation model’s formulation, including the 
flow of electrical energy from energy generation sources to load allocation sinks. This 
formulation utilized supply nodes to represent energy generation sources and demand 
nodes to represent loads where each facility consumes energy. The energy “source” side of 
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the flow problem is referenced as the microgrid’s generation side, and; the energy “sink” 
side is referenced as the microgrid’s load side. The source and sink formulation structure 
is further discussed in energy flow conservation constraints managed across a specific 
boundary. This boundary is defined by the point where energy flow conservation is 
managed. These boundaries can define an entire microgrid context, subsections (e.g., 
busses), or only specific loading points. The boundary depends on the desired constriction 
of flow balance. The load and generation sides are used to organize different nodes when 
modeling the network flow of energy on a microgrid. The next section introduces the 
indices required for organizing the simulation nodes and indexing through the simulation 
2. Indices 
This section introduces the generation, load, and time indices required for 
architecting a microgrid simulation model. For constructing the microgrid simulation 
model’s load side, an index of f is used to organize each facility requiring energy on the 
microgrid.  
 f: Energy consuming facility node in the microgrid simulation model. 
The microgrid simulation model’s generation side is required to model the total 
amount of energy received or created for consumption by the load side. The generation 
nodes are indexed by source, s. 
 s: Energy generation source node in the microgrid simulation model. 
A generation node can be used to represent each generator, ESS, PV array, or even 
utility grid point of common coupling (PCC). Lastly, a timestep index, h, orchestrates the 
hazard scenario presentation, energy flow calculations, and resultant disruption data for 
each simulation period. 
 h: Hourly timestep during the microgrid model simulation. 
The simulation duration should be determined based on the anticipated scope 
required to observe the hazard scenario’s resultant impacts. f, s, and h are the indices 
required for organizing the microgrid simulation model. Parameters applied across these 
indices include fixed system parameters; they are further discussed in section 3. For 
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microgrid models with multiple boundaries (i.e., distributed ESS), subscript o and i  are 
used to organize energy transferred across boundaries. 
 o : Outbound to the energy conservation boundary 
 i : inbound to the energy conservation boundary 
Outbound, o, and inbound, i, are utilized in multiple boundary energy conservation 
constraints shown in Equation (7). 
3. Parameters 
Parameters used in this simulation model include fixed system specification 
parameters, data-informed parameters, and scenario informed parameters. These parameter 
types are defined, and then examples are utilized to convey their utility in a microgrid 
simulation model. All types of parameters are solidified prior to the commencement of a 
microgrid simulation scenario. Although data-informed and scenario informed parameters 
might vary during the simulation, they are preprogrammed and do not react to any 
simulation function. 
a. Fixed System Specification Parameters 
This section presents the fixed system specifications for both the microgrid 
simulation model’s load side and generation side. Fixed load parameters encompass 
stakeholder provided information about facility importance for quantifying disruption. 
Facility-specific MI values are implemented in the model using the fixed parameter, M. 
Each M can be unique for each facility shown below 
 fM : Assigned MI value for unmet power requirement indexed for each 
facility, f. 
On the generation side, fixed system parameters are associated with performance 
ratings for systems such as generators, ESS, and PV arrays. Relevant specifications for a 
fossil fuel generator system are presented in the following list: 
 Pw: Generator Power Output Rating (KW) 
 F y : Fuel Tank Capacity (gal) 
 mFl : Minimum Fuel (gal) 
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 ( )gene : Energy generation efficiency (gal/KWh) 
The following list shows similar parameters for modeling attributes of an ESS: 
 Pd : Discharge rating (KW) Discharge rating (KW) 
 MCh : Maximum Charge Capacity (KWh) 
 mCh : minimum Charge (KWh) 
 ( )esse : One-way efficiency (KWh/KWh) 
Unlike the fossil fuel generators and ESS, photovoltaic (PV) array performance was 
incorporated using the following fixed solar panel specification parameters: 
 PVa : Area of Photovoltaic (PV) Solar Panels (m2) 
 ) (pve : Efficiency of PV Solar Panels (Wm2/ Wm2) 
b. Data-Informed Parameters 
The parameters in this section employ representative data for capturing non-static 
influences on the microgrid model simulation. These data-informed parameters can be 
applied to both the load side and the microgrid simulation model’s generation side. A load 
side example involves applying facility energy consumption data throughout the 
simulation. Generation data parameters are populated from data that improve the fidelity 
of the simulation. Specifically, incorporating location-based hourly solar irradiance data 
can capture solar power generation’s hourly influences on the microgrid simulation model. 
This section uses historic building consumption data to improve the power consumption 
parameters analogous to Peterson’s Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model (2019). 
A facility’s general energy consumption requirement is represented by the data 
parameter Lr. When indexed for each facility, f, and then for each hour of simulation, h, 
this parameter matures to the following: 
 fhLr : Energy consumption data for facility, f, during hour, h. 
The following example data shows how facility #1’s hourly load requirement 
parameter changes each hour according to the data set: 
 Lr1h : Facility #1’s building hourly energy requirements. 
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Figure 21. Example Facility #1’s Hourly Energy Requirements from a 
24-hour Data Sample (Lr1h , h=[1,2,3,…,22,23,24]). Adapted from 
Peterson (2019). 
Figure 21 shows how building consumption data can be used to populate hourly 
energy consumption parameters for a simulation period from hour 1 through hour 24. This 
example explains how a building’s hourly energy requirements can be implemented to 
capture changes in hourly energy demands throughout a typical day. Sample hourly facility 
consumption data can be obtained from the MATLAB-based Monterey Microgrid 
Simulation Model (Peterson 2019).  
In addition to building energy consumption data, solar environmental data for a 
typical year in Monterey, CA, was referenced from the MATLAB-based Monterey 
Microgrid Simulation Model. Similarly, Direct Normal Irradiance (DNI) was included as 
the following parameter: 
 shDNI : DNI influence on solar energy ( 2W m ) to PV array source, s, for 
each hour, h. 
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DNI is “the direct irradiance received on a plane normal to the sun over the total 
solar spectrum and is defined DNI.” (Blanc et al. 2014). Blanc et al. further explain that 
DNI is an essential component for representing a solar resource for a variety of solar 
technologies (2014). As a good base assumption, DNI will suffice for this simulation model 
assuming each solar panel farm is relatively collocated; solar panels are fixed to a normal 
plane orientation and subjected to cloudless conditions for solar exposure. Equation (19) 
shows how DNI is applied to PV array system parameters for representing energy 
generated from the PV array. 
This section explained how data could be incorporated into the microgrid 
simulation model as parameters. A building’s hourly consumption data was converted to 
an associated load requirement parameter indexed through each hour of simulation. 
Additionally, the solar panel environmental parameter DNI was associated with PV array 
power generation performance. These parameters allow relevant data from hourly 
variations in energy demands or the environmental conditions to be represented during a 
microgrid simulation. Parameters can also be varied to influence the functionality of 
simulation nodes when subjected to hazard scenarios. These scenario informed parameters 
are discussed in the following section 
c. Scenario Informed Parameters 
This section explains how failed components on a microgrid state diagram can be 
represented during a simulation. A state parameter, St, is used to convey the functional 
status of Facility, f. Generic, working and failed operational states parameters are listed 
below: 
 fhSt : Operational state of Facility, f, during hour, h, of simulation. 
 12 1St  : Facility 1 is working throughout hour 2 of the simulation. 
 13 0St  : Facility 1 is failed throughout hour 3 of the simulation. 
The state parameter, St, is simplified to represent only fully operable or completely 
failed. A state parameter will need to be indexed across each microgrid simulation node. 
Only the nodes impacted by the hazard scenario are changed from operational to failed. 
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These binary state options are further discussed in the constraints section. A facility may 
not be directly impacted by hazard scenario through St, but insufficient power combined 
with low priority may result in the microgrid controller deciding to shed that facility’s 
power. Microgrid controller behavior is replicated using decision variables and is discussed 
in the following section. 
4. Variables 
There are two types of variables presented in the formulation of this simulation 
model. The first type is decision variables (DVs) that the solver manipulates to improve 
the objective function result towards the most favorable value. The second type, indirect 
variables, is used only to bundle previously discussed parameters and DVs to convey the 
model’s construction. The utility of the indirect variables does not extend beyond a means 
for explaining the simulation model. DVs and indirect variables are utilized in the 
following equations for both the objective function and constraints in formulating the 
microgrid simulation model. 
a. Decision Variables  
Decision variables (DVs) are used to control which facilities receive power on the 
load side and how much power is generated on the source side. P is the decision variable 
used to select whether a facility receives power. P controls whether a facility’s load 
requirement is met and is illuminated in the following examples: 
 fhP :  Whether Facility, f, receives power during hour, h, of simulation. 
 Pfh = 1: Facility 1 is allocated it’s power requirement, Lr,  during hour 
2 of the simulation. 
 Pfh  = 0: Facility 1 is denied it’s power requirement, Lr,  during hour 2 
of the simulation. 
First, P is shown in generic form followed by examples of power selection and 
deselection. A separate type of load allocation DV is required for multiple system 
boundaries (i.e., distributed ESS). Poh, represents the positive amount of energy sent 
outside the system boundary (i.e., to another bus on the microgrid) and constrained by 
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equation (8). On the generation side, decision variables control generator throttle settings 
and ESS discharge rates.  
For generators, an example throttling DV is shown below: 
 shTh : Throttle output setting (%) at source, s, during hour, h. 
Similar to the throttle setting of a generator, Th was used as the throttle setting for 
controlling the amount of energy discharged by an ESS during hour, h. The load allocation 
and generation throttle DVs are used to control the flow of energy across the microgrid. 
The next section discusses the objective function used to imitate the flow of energy. 
b. Indirect Variables 
Indirect variables are developed to better convey the formulation of energy flow 
and accumulation of MI in this simulation model. This section covers indirect variables 
used to group decision variables and parameters together for organizing hourly energy 
consumption and generation behavior on a simulation model. First, an example microgrid 
source-sink flow model introduces overall consumption and generation indirect variables. 
Additional indirect parameters are used to relate a facility’s individual energy consumption 
compared or consequential accumulation of mission impact. The organization provided by 
these indirect variables is beneficial for understanding how the microgrid simulation model 
emulates realistic behavior. 
There are various types of energy consumption and generation nodes with different 
attributes. Examples of these attributes are shown in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22. Source-Sink Diagram of Sample Microgrid 
On the load side of  Figure 22, Load, L, denotes energy consumed by each facility, 
f, during each simulation period time period. The power consumption consequence for 
providing power to a facility, f, for a specific hour, h, is that the power is consumed and 
increases the overall power required for that hour. The total power required is dependent 
on the load consumed.  
 fhL : Load consumed (KWh) by facility, f, during hour, h. 
Specifically,  
Figure 22 depicts three instances of load, L, involving both a facility type and 
consequential MI for each hour that each facility’s power requirements are not met. A 
working facility, allocated power, consumes energy, L, during that period equal to that 
facility’s energy requirement parameter Lr. The DV, P, about whether to commit energy 
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to specific facility results in either load consumed, LF, or MI incurred for that hour. MI is 
incurred using the indirect variable Mifh.  
 fhMi : Simulation-specific MI incurred by facility, f, during hour, h. 
The accumulation of hourly MI during a microgrid simulation, Mifh, is tracked 
through equation (1). The hourly totals of facilities energy consumption, Lf, is shown in 
equation (6). Next, the indirect variables, which organize the generation side of a microgrid 
simulation model, are explained. 
Figure 22 shows four different types of generation nodes indexed by source, s. The 
generation indirect variable, G, is defined to organize the energy generated by each source, 
S, during each hour, h, shown below: 
 shG : Energy generated (KWh) by source, s, during hour, h. 
Source 1, in Figure 22, represents a fossil fuel generator and uses indirect variables 
for associating power output and fuel storage quantities influenced by the throttle DV, Th.  
  shFs : Fuel state quantity of generation source s, at the start of hour, h. 
These indirect variables were used to formulate the relationship between power 
generation in equation (12) and fuel consumption as it influences the remaining fuel 
quantity. Power generation’s influence on fuel quantity is described in the constraints with 
section 6. 
Instead of a fuel quantity state, a state of charge is represented by the following 
indirect variable: 
 shChs : ESS state of charge (KWh) by source, s, after hour, h. 
State of charge is used for determining the amount of ESS storage remaining after 
a period discharge based on Th. Change in state of charge, Chs, due to throttle setting, Th, 
for an ESS is explained in equation (15) described in the constraints with section 6. 
This section reviewed the indirect variables, which communicate the flow of energy 
or accumulation of MI that results from decisions affected by the DVs. The constraint 
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equations in section 6 show these indirect variables are composed only of combinations of 
DVs and parameters. However, they were incorporated to convey and track MI 
accumulation, facility-specific load allocation, and resource levels for fuel and ESS charge. 
The next section covers the objective function, which is oriented to minimize the overall 
accumulation of MI. 
5. Objective Function   
This section introduces the basic function for driving both energy generation source 
DVs and load DVs toward minimizing hourly MI accumulation. In Equation (1), hourly 
accumulation of MI, MiFh, is totaled across all facilities, f, for each hour, h on the microgrid 
simulation model.  
  1 1 ,1
n n
fh fh fh fhf f
M inim ize M i P St M h
 
      (1) 
Equation (1) shows the objective function for the microgrid simulation model. The 
overall MI tracking is used to collect and organize decision variables and parameters for 
organizing hourly energy consumption and generation behavior on a simulation model. 
This function is influenced by the state parameters, St, and decision variables P. For 
instances where all St and P = 1, there is no MI, incurred. However, scenarios with 
insufficient energy to fulfill every facility’s, f, load requirements, Lr, requires load 
shedding. This objective function drives load shedding decisions to minimize mission 
impact. Loading requirements and other microgrid control behaviors are further explained 
by discussing model constraints in the next section. 
6. Constraints 
This section covers the constraints that both the objective function and the 
microgrid model are subjected to when using a Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) 
macro, Solver add-in, and a spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel. This microgrid simulation 
model enforces constraints in three different ways listed below: 
 Macro enforced 
 Solver enforced 
 Cell enforced 
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Macro enforced constraints are implemented through logic statements that act as 
tripwires for inducing a follow-on solver. Solver enforced constraints are those enforced 
explicitly by the MS Excel Solver. Cell enforced constraints are applied through formula 
defined relationships between different spreadsheet cell references. These constraints apply 
realism to the simulation and churn the simulation through a hazard scenario for collecting 
resilience data. 
a. Macro Enforced Constraints 
The overall model structure provides the organization of macro enforced model 
constraints. Unlike the load shedding microgrid control logic from the Monterey Microgrid 
MATLAB Model (Peterson 2019), this method uses an Excel macro to organize a series of 
four independently triggered solvers shown in Figure 23. 
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Green action boxes represent a “Generators-Only” solve, orange action boxes represent “Generators and ESS” solve, yellow boxes represent 
“ESS-Only” solve, and red boxes represent “No Generators or ESS” solve. 




Similarities to the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model include ESS engagement 
criteria. Differences involve an adaptive load shedding strategy and a paralleled utility 
power availability. To replicate ESS engagement behavior, Figure 23 utilizes generators 
only from internal microgrid generation sources. ESS is engaged if load demand exceeds 









   (2) 
The hour parameter, h, is referenced as the current simulation period where the 
microgrid logic is applied. The extent of the index to number, n, represents the number of 
operable generators. Next, if the generator’s fuel state, Fs, or functioning status, St, 
precludes operation, the “ESS-Only” solver engages. This macro-enforced constraint 
requires the ESS to be operable and have greater than minimum charge, Chs, shown in 
equation (3). 
 
1 1 1 1
n n n n
sh sh s sh sh s
s s s s
St Fs mFl St Chs mCh
   
       (3) 
If both fuel state and state of charge preclude generator and ESS engagement, the 
last type of solve engages “No Generators or ESS” to complete the time step shown in 
equation (4). 
 
1 1 1 1
n n n n
sh sh s sh sh s
s s s s
St Fs mFl St Chs mCh
   
       (4)  
 
Utility grid engagement is treated as a predetermined energy generation source and 
discussed as a cell enforced constraint.  
The Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model approached load shedding in a 
predetermined order (Peterson 2019). This method and model utilize an MS Excel solver, 
which continuously assess a facility’s varying load requirement, Lr, compared to the 
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stakeholder assigned Mf value. The optimal load assignment combination is oriented 
towards minimizing mission impact, Mi, under this new MS Excel solver logic. Even the 
most important facility—indicated by the highest Mf value—may experience a power 
interruption if their MF value is both not greater than the sum of the remaining facilities Mf 
values and their Lr exceeds the remaining facilities’ load requirements. This microgrid 
control logic leverages macro enforced constraints for simulating an accepted ESS 
engagement logic (Peterson 2019). MS Excel Solvers permitted parallel incorporation of 
available Utility Grid power and Mi minimizing load shedding strategy. Solver enforced 
constraints that guide the selection of load assignments, and generation throttle settings are 
described in the following section. 
b. Solver Enforced Constraints 
Similar to the macro enforced constraints, these solver constraints can also be 
written in the MS Excel VBA macro for increased automation. Unlike macro enforced 
constraints that rely on logic flow described in the previous section, these constraints are 
enforced using the MS Excel solvers. These solver enforced constraints organize into two 
categories. The first category defines constraints that apply to all four solvers described in 
Figure 23. The second category covers solver enforced constraints that are unique to each 
MS Excel solver type based on the DVs impacted. Both common and unique solver-
enforced constraints are required for maintaining the realistic behavior of the microgrid 
simulation model. 
The load allocation constraints remain constant across each MS Excel solver. 
Constraints for load allocation to facilities and overall energy flow conservation within the 
boundaries remain constant through different generation configurations. The DV facility 
load allocation, Pfh, is constrained to binary values shown in equation (5). 
  0,1FhP   (5) 
For Pfh = 0, that facility is not allocated power and MI is incurred at the amount of 
Mifh for equation (1). Pfh  = 1 means the facility’s hourly load requirement was allocated 
and MI is not incurred, but; this allocation of power, using Pfh, requires energy to meet that 
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facility’s hourly load requirement, Lrfh. The overall load requirement for all facilities 
allocated power through Pfh  = 1, is totaled using Lfh,. This conservation-of-energy 
constraint limits the total load consumed, Lfh, from exceeding the total hourly energy 









    (6) 
Equation (6) shows how the total hourly energy consumed by facilities,  f, must not 
exceed total hourly energy generated by sources, s.  
For microgrids managed with multiple boundaries (i.e., ones with multiple buses), 
a variation to the energy conservation constraint includes inbound, i, and outbound, o, 
energy transfers shown in equation (7). 
 
1 1 1 1
,
n n n n
fh oh sh ih
f o s i
L L G G h
   
        (7)
   
Outbound load, Loh, from equation (7) represents the variable amount of power sent 
out of a system boundary. Outbound energy transfer DV, Poh, is constrained to positive 
values using equation (8) 
 0ohP   (8) 
The outbound flow constraint shown in equation (8) prevents negative amounts of 
energy from being sent out of a system boundary by constraining the DV, Poh, for each 
outbound connection, o, during each simulation hour, h. The facility load allocation, energy 
flow conservation, and energy transfer constraints remain common across all four solvers. 
Next, constraints specific to the “Generators-Only” solver are discussed. 
Solver enforced constraints for the first “Generators Only” solver impact throttle 
settings for the generators throttle DV, Thsh shown in equation (9). 
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 0 1shTh   (9) 
Equation (9) shows how the generator throttle DV, Thsh, is limited between 0 and 
100%. In the second solver, “Generators and ESS,” equation (9) is used to similarly 
constrain ESS discharge rate. An additional solver enforced constraint is applied to keep 
ESS state of charge, Chs, positive through equation (10). 
 0shChs   (10) 
The constraint from equation (10) prevents the solver from depleting the ESS below 
zero before a macro enforced constraint triggers the final “No Gens or ESS” solver. This 
relaxation is to ensure feasible solutions for instances where Chssh = 0 due to damage, St=0. 
The third solver is the “ESS Only Solver,” yet; the solver enforced ESS constraints remain 
unchanged. The fourth and final solver, “No Gens or ESS,” utilizes the constraints common 
across all four solvers. With macro enforced and solver enforced constraints discussed, cell 
enforced constraints are covered in the next section. 
c. Cell Enforced Constraints 
Cell enforced constraints leverage the formulas embedded within MS Excel 
spreadsheet cells, which can be expeditiously copied for rapidly building or rearranging 
components with this type of microgrid simulation model. First, this section discusses load 
side constraints for totaling hourly energy consumption, Lfh. Next, this section covers 
source side constraints for computing hourly energy generated, Gsh, from generators, ESS, 
utility grid connection and PV arrays. Additionally, fuel states, Fs, ESS state of charge, 
Chs, constraints are explained. Implementation of the binary hazard scenario informed state 
parameters, St, is multiplied into the total quantity where a null value would prevent 
operation. 
The Mi tracking function from equation (1) shows how null values for either PFh or 
StFh results in Mi being incurred for that hour, h. Conversely, when a facility is both 
allocated energy Pfh  = 1, and working Stfh  = 1, load is consumed, Lfh. The specific amount 
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consumed corresponds to that facility’s load requirement, Lrfh. The total amount of energy 





fh fh fh fh
f f
L P St Lr h
 
    (11) 
To meet the hourly energy demand from the total load consumed in equation (11), 
generation source energy output, Gsh is required. Generators provide energy output, Gsh, 
based on both a DV throttle setting, Thsh, and power rating parameter, Pgs, depicted in 
equation (12). 
 sh sh shsG Th Pg St  
 (12) 
A higher generator throttle setting, ThSh, consequently consumes more fuel shown 
in equation (13). 
  1   sh sh sh gen sFs Fs G e   (13) 
The generator’s fuel state from equation (13) is influenced by the previous period’s 
fuel state combined with the current period’s energy output, GSh, and generator efficiency, 
e(gen)s. Like a generator consuming fuel to produce energy, the energy provided by 
discharging an ESS is shown in equation (14). 
  sh sh shsG Th Pd St  (14) 
Equation (14) shows how energy from an ESS depends on discharge throttle setting, 
Thsh, and discharge power rating, PdS. An operable ESS discharged to provide energy 













The ESS charge state from equation (15) is expanded with ESS recharging shown 




















Equation (16) directs how excess energy from the period is assumed to charge the 
ESS. This assumption does not limit the ESS charging source to the PV array like the 
Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. A cell-embedded “if” conditional is used to 
prevent Chsh from exceeding maximum charge, MCh and is shown in equation (17). 
 shChs MCh  (17) 
Excel specific implementation of equation (17) can be found in the MS Excel 
spreadsheets from Chapters VII, VIII, and IX. Another constrain equation applied at the 
microgrid generation side is the utility grid point of common coupling (PCC) connection. 
No decision variable is associated with the utility grid constraint equation. The energy 










   (18) 
Equation (18) shows how the only enabling requirement to receive utility grid 
energy is the operational status of the utility grid connection Stsh. An operating utility grid 
is assumed to meet the microgrid’s energy demands without requiring a separate utility-
connected model in Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. Similar to the utility grid 
connection, DV is used for modeling energy generated from the PV array.  
PV array energy contribution to the microgrid is influenced by fixed system 
specification parameters involving the area of the solar panels, PVas, the efficiency of the 
PV array, eS, from the following equation (19). 
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 ( ) 0.001sh s h PV s shG PVa DNI e St  (19) 
Beyond the fixed parameters in equation (19), PV array output changes through the 
data-informed parameter, DNIh. W/m2 is the standard unit for DNIh received from solar 
environmental data utilized in the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model and further 
discussed in model validation of Chapter V (Peterson 2019). 
Finally, the total energy generated is constrained to equal the sum of individual 
amounts generated in equation (20). 
 
 
 ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )
( ) ( )  ( )
1 1 1 1 1
0.001  
n gens n ess n grid n pvn
sh sh gen s sh sh ess s sh sh fh s h pv s sh
s s s f s
s sG Th Pg e St Th Pd e St St Lr PVa DNI e St
    
        
  (20) 
Total energy contributed from the generators, ESS, utility grid connection, and PV 
array have been encompassed by equation (20).  
This section discussed load side constraints for totaling hourly energy consumption. 
Throttle dependent output from generators and ESS were introduced with associated fuel 
quantity and charge consequence. Utility grid connection and PV array constraints were 
discussed. Finally, the total energy generation was constrained. MS Excel specific 
implementations of these constraints can be seen in the microgrid simulation models in 
chapter. The next section involves the execution of this model for calculating consequence 
and resilience measures organized by step six of the RAP  
F. STEP-6: CALCULATE CONSEQUENCE AND RESILIENCE MEASURES 
The sixth RAP step is calculating consequence and resilience metrics. In basic 
analysis, the RAP accepts consequence values to be used as the resilience metrics. 
Improvements from the RAP involve additional resilience measures, which capture 
previously defined resilience characteristics. This section shows how average θg and 
islanding time expand upon the original disruption resilience measure, MI. These 
consequence and resilience measures are calculated for an example set of hazard scenarios 
80 
on a baseline a single ESS (baseline) microgrid configuration. The identical hazard 
scenarios are reiterated for a double ESS for evaluating system improvements. 
The example hazard scenario involves an ESS failing at second timestep, t=2 of a 
24-hour period. The 24-hour period represents the last day of a 14-day installation islanding 
period where overall generator fuel quantity is depleted. This example scenario is used to 
test resilience in a single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation model with parameters 
shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Fixed System Parameters for Single ESS Microgrid 
(Baseline) Configuration 
Figure 24 shows fixed system parameters for both generator and ESS output and 
storage values. Next, the example single ESS microgrid baseline performance plot and 


















The red-shaded area represents MI. The magenta circles represent points, which influenced 
the average θg. The bolded black line depicts the averaged glideslope,  θg.  
Figure 25. Single ESS (No Hazard): Performance Plot and Resilience 
Measures 
Figure 25 illuminates performance and provides resilience measures MI, average 
θg, and survival periods. Overall MI is represented by the red-shaded area and amounts to 
4310. Average θg measures -1.35 deg. Islandinging time, indicated by survival periods, is 
20 hours for the single ESS. The red line remains at 100% representing no microgrid 
damage incurred. Next, the single ESS microgrid performance is plotted, and resilience 
measures are calculated for a single ESS failure hazard scenario. The single ESS microgrid 
performance for this hazard scenario is depicted in Figure 26.  
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The red-shaded area represents MI. The magenta circles represent points, which influenced 
the average θg. The bolded black line depicts the averaged glideslope,  θg. 
Figure 26. Single ESS (Baseline): Single ESS Failure 
Figure 26 shows the performance plot and resilience measures for the hazard 
scenario subjected to the single ESS. The next hazard scenario shows a dual generator 




The red-shaded area represents MI. The magenta circles represent points, which influenced 
the average θg. The bolded black line depicts the averaged glideslope,  θg. 
Figure 27. Single ESS (Baseline): Dual Generator Failure at Time 
(h=2), Performance Plot and Resilience Measures 
Figure 27 shows how the rapid performance drop, after the dual generator failure, 
resulted in a significant average θg. However, the working ESS and PV Array extend 
islanding time out to 22 survival periods. Performance from the next hazard scenario 




The red-shaded area represents MI. The magenta circles represent points, which influenced 
the average θg. The bolded black line depicts the averaged glideslope,  θg. 
Figure 28. Single ESS (Baseline): Tornado Destroys Single ESS, PV 
Array, and Interbus Connections at Time (h=2), Performance Plot and 
Resilience Measures 
The performance drop in Figure 28 is relatively graceful, with an initial drop from 
100% to 75% for six post-incident periods. This docile drop in performance contributes to 
a shallower average θg and indicates a graceful descent in performance deterioration. 
Measures from this hazard scenario are tabulated with additional hazard scenarios in  
Table 8.  
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Table 8. Single (Baseline) Microgrid Resilience Measure Comparison 
Across the Numbered Scenarios 
 
Table 8 provides resilience measures for the baseline single ESS microgrid 
configuration across four example hazard scenarios. Scenario 0 (no damage) still incurred 
performance degradations due to generator fuel starvation and ESS charge depletion. Next, 
Scenario 1 had the most favorable resilience measures correlated across MI and θg. 
Scenario 3 had the worst average θg of -4.07 deg but achieved the longest islanding time 
of 22 hours. Scenario 4 had the worst MI, at 7470, but achieved a more favorable average 
θg compared to Scenario 3.  
Consequence and resilience measures were gathered for the single ESS (baseline)  
microgrid configuration from four different hazard scenarios. As a percentage of worst-
case MI, MI’s performance plots were used to calculate θg, and islanding time resilience 
summarized in Table 8. The next RAP step uses these resilience measures and performance 
plots for assessing improvements such as whether distributing a single ESS into a double 
ESS microgrid system increases resilience on installations. 
 
Single ESS Microgrid (Baseline) 
 
Scenario (#) MI (units) Average θg (deg) 
Islanding Time 
(hrs) 
No Damage (0) 4310 -1.35 20 
Single ESS 
Failure (1) 








Single ESS, PV 
Array, and Inter-





G. STEP-7: EVALUATE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS 
RAP Step 7 involves evaluating system improvements by iterating RAP steps one 
through six for different resilience improvement options. This thesis does not include 
probabilistic assessments related to recovery and indirect measures (e.g., lost revenue) 
mentioned in the RAP. System improvement evaluations rely on deterministic simulations 
of identical hazard scenarios across microgrids with different ESS configurations. This 
example evaluation compares the single ESS (baseline) microgrid against a double ESS 
microgrid model. 
This comparison only focuses on comparing the different levels of ESS distribution 
from one to two ESS. Overall ESS capacity, and other comparative parameters, are held 
constant and shown in Figure 29.  
 
Figure 29. Comparative Parameters for Single and Double ESS 
Microgrid Configurations 
Figure 29 shows how overall ESS capacity and output are equivalent are held 
constant for both single and double ESS microgrid configurations. Next, the performance 
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plot of the initial double ESS microgrid simulation run without any hazards is shown in 
Figure 30.  
 
The red-shaded area represents MI. The magenta squares represent points, which 
influenced the average θg. The bolded black line depicts the averaged glideslope,  θg.  
Figure 30. Double ESS: No Hazard Performance Plot and Resilience 
Measures 
Figure 30 shows the performance of the double ESS microgrid configuration with 
three performance drops. The survival time of 21 hours characterizes the depletion of 
generator fuel, exhaustion of ESS, and solar energy absence. The performance plot and 
resilience measures for the double ESS microgrid subjected to a single ESS failure are 
depicted in Figure 31. 
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The red-shaded area represents MI. The magenta squares represent points, which 
influenced the average θg. The bolded black line depicts the averaged glideslope,  θg. 
Figure 31. Double ESS: Single ESS Failure at Time (h=2), 
Performance Plot and Resilience Measures 
Figure 31 shows how an islanding time of 22 survival periods can still incur more 
MI through repeated performance drops below 50%. The performance drops in periods 17 
and 18 also adversely influenced average θg to -1.58 deg. 
The next hazard scenario performance plot involves the double ESS microgrid 





The red-shaded area represents MI. The magenta squares represent points, which 
influenced the average θg. The bolded black line depicts the averaged glideslope,  θg. 
Figure 32. Double ESS: Dual Generator Failure at Time (h=2), 
Performance Plot and Resilience Measures 
Figure 32 shows the double ESS microgrids performance when subjected to a dual 
generator failure. Although islanding time extends out to 21 survival periods, the rapid 
drop in performance during period two contributes to a significant average θg  of -3.63 deg. 
Lastly, the double ESS microgrid performance plot in Figure 36 represents the hazard 
scenario involving multiple component destruction from a tornado hazard. 
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The red-shaded area represents MI. The magenta squares represent points, which 
influenced the average θg. The bolded black line depicts the averaged glideslope,  θg. 
Islanding Time is reported as > 24 survival periods. 
Figure 33. Double ESS: Tornado Destroys Single ESS, PV Array, and 
Interbus Connections at Time (h=2), Performance Plot and Resilience 
Measures  
The islanding time is reported as greater than 24 hours in Figure 33; because there 
are not sufficient data points to determine the final survival period. Greater than 24 survival 
hours is sufficient for comparing against the single ESS (baseline) microgrid.  
The resilience measures, MI, average θg, and islanding time are summarized for 
both the single ESS (baseline) microgrid and double ESS microgrid in Table 9. 
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Table 9 summarizes the resilience measures for comparing the single ESS 
(baseline) microgrid against the double ESS microgrid. The microgrid comparison 
illuminated which ESS configuration had more favorable resilience measures for each 
scenario. For each resilience measure during each scenario, a more favorable resilience 
measure indication, colored green, for one ESS configuration results in a less favorable 
indication, red-colored, for the alternative ESS configuration. Yellow-colored resilience 
measures represent instances where the values were approximately equivalent between 
both ESS configurations. Out of the four scenarios, the double ESS had the most favorable 
resilience measure instances across MI, average θg, and islanding time. A secondary 













No Damage (0) 4310 -1.35 20 3980 -1.38 21
 Single ESS Failure 
(1)
5060 -1.59 17 4160 -1.58 22
Single Generator 
Failure (2)
5140 -1.69 17 4213 -1.6 21
Dual Generator 
Failure (3)
6660 -4.07 22 5590 -3.63 21
Tornado Destroys: 
Single ESS, PV 
Array, and Interbus 
connection (4)











Scenario 3, dual generator failure, shows how the lowest average θg is not associated with 
the highest MI values. The difference between MI and average θg illuminated in Figure 34. 
 
The blue circles represent scenario data points for single ESS (baseline) microgrid average 
θg vs. MI. The orange circles represent scenario data points for double ESS microgrid 
average θg vs. MI. Pairing lines connect results from both microgrid results for each 
scenario run. 
Figure 34. Average θg vs. Mission Impact for Single ESS (baseline) 
Microgrid Against Double ESS Microgrid 
Scenarios with lower average θg values normally correlate with increased MI values 
in Figure 34. However, the dual generator failure scenario from Table 9 shows how the 
lowest average θg was not associated with the highest MI. This average θg drop is also 
depicted in Figure 34. It shows how ESS configurations resilient to overall MI may still be 
susceptible to rapid performance drops indicated by a steep average θg. 
RAP Step 7 started with reiterating steps 1–6 for a double ESS for comparing both 
performance and resilience measures to the single ESS (baseline). The double ESS had 
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more favorable resilience measures for MI, average θg, and islanding time across four 
unique hazard scenarios. Within these four scenarios, the double ESS has increased 
resilience from the single ESS (baseline). Resilience measures average θg and MI were 
plotted against each other to illuminate a potentially specialized frontier for follow-on 
system improvements. Stakeholder preferences should inform follow-on system 
improvement goals to favor shallower average θg or lower overall MI. Evaluation 
information can also be used to propose alternative or follow-on improvements for 
evaluation. Engineering improvements is a continuous effort. 
H. SUMMARY 
This methodology’s analysis is based on a modified version of Sandia National 
Lab’s resilience analysis process (RAP) for conducting system improvement evaluations. 
An example organizational resilience goal was defined, consequence categories and 
performance-based resilience measures were determined. Example hazards were 
characterized, and hazard scenarios linked to a simulation model state matrix were 
contrived. For the system model, a network flow formulation framed the design of an MS 
Excel-based, macro-organized solver for hazard scenario simulation. This improved 
microgrid simulation model executed four example hazard scenarios against a single ESS 
(baseline) microgrid to provide consequence and resilience measures. Lastly, the previous 
RAP steps were repeated for a double ESS microgrid configuration for comparing 
resilience measures against the single ESS (baseline) microgrid model. Under these 
specific example scenarios, the double ESS microgrid configuration predominantly yielded 
more favorable resilience measure values for MI, average θg, and islanding time. However, 
a divergence between the resilience measures MI and average θg for high-impact hazard 
scenarios provided context for refining stakeholder priorities. This methodology 
formulated an analysis process and an MS Excel-based hazard simulation model for 
evaluating system improvements. In the next chapter, this modified RAP evaluated 
different ESS variations from the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model for determining 
whether distributing ESS resulted in greater resilience of microgrids. 
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IV. CENTRALIZED VS. DISTRIBUTED ESS MICROGRID 
EXPERIMENTATION 
The experiments presented in this chapter apply the modified RAP process 
introduced in the previous chapter to analyze whether distributing ESS throughout a 
microgrid rather than centrally locating ESS results in greater resilience on a representative 
microgrid. The initial single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation model is replicated from 
the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. RAP iterations after the single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid include a double ESS microgrid and a Quintuple ESS microgrid for evaluating 
system improvements. Everything was held constant except for increased ESS distribution 
and associated connections. This section’s results include performance plots, resilience 
measures, and an evaluation for determining whether distributing ESS results in greater 
resilience in microgrids. 
 SINGLE ESS (BASELINE) MICROGRID ASSESSMENT 
The single ESS (baseline) microgrid assessment applied the modified RAP from 
the previous chapter. Specifically, the following steps have been executed: 
1. Define Resilience Goals 
2. Define Consequence Categories & Resilience Metrics 
3. Characterize Hazards 
4. Determine Level of Disruption 
5. Collect Data via System Model 
6. Calculate Consequences & Resilience Metrics 
7. Evaluate System Improvements 
Microgrid layout and specifications are introduced during system model 
construction in Step 5.  
1. Step 1: Define Resilience Goals 
This first RAP step relies on input from actual stakeholders for installation-specific 
resilience goals. When conducting a resilience assessment of an installation’s microgrid, 
three recommended stakeholder sources should provide feedback. First, Vugrin et al. 
recommend including the facility, planning, and operations departments (2017). Second, 
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Peterson identifies facilities personnel, facilities manager, and utility managers as primary 
stakeholders. Finally, the most important stakeholder should be the installation commander 
supported by his maintenance, safety, supply, operations, and information technology 
departments and connected to tenant organizations’ commanders. Resilience improvement 
efforts cannot lose sight of these tenant organizations that microgrid systems are designed 
to support. Installation requirements are discussed further as DOD energy security 
expectations in Chapter  I. The following application-specific resilience goal supported 
these resilience experiments: 
Research Resilience Goal: To sustain daily command prioritized mission 
capability levels of the installation’s tenant organizations by steadily 
continuing to meet their facilities’ hourly minimum essential power 
availability requirements during low and high impact hazard events. 
This research resilience goal framed the selection of resilience measures from 
Chapter  II. Resilience measure selection is further discussed in the following section. 
2. Step 2: Define Consequence Categories & Resilience Metrics 
Consequence categories and resilience metrics from Table 5 were applied to these 
experiments. MI connected power availability to the organization. Capability orientation 
of MI involved dividing the current hourly MI value by the worst-case MI value. For 
example, a facility with no MI is presumed at 100% capability. A Facility with the worst 
possible MI value is presumed to be at 0% mission capability. Average θg captured the 
priority of stability for steadily continuing to provide power. Finally, Islanding Time 
captured the sustain portion to measure how long a microgrid can survive after an initiating 
event. These resilience measures were instrumented for testing whether distributing ESS 
results in increased resilience in installation microgrids. Resilience testing was driven by 
low and high impact events informed from hazards characterized by the next section. 
3. Step 3: Characterize Hazards 
Characterizing hazards is required to justify the selection of hazard scenarios 
imposed during microgrid simulations. A comprehensive resilience analysis for a specific 
installation should address stakeholder specified hazards of concern. For these 
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experiments, a few interesting hazards have been picked, which do or could happen. The 
following generic stakeholder hazards of concern have been summarized in Table 10 
Table 10. Experiment Stakeholder Hazards of Concern 
Hazards of Concern Representation 
Generator Failure Point Failure 
ESS Failure Point Failure 
Hailstorm Point Failure 




Tornado Destructive path 
Forest Fire Destructive path 
 
The hazards of concern from Table 10 should inform the hazard scenarios for 
microgrid simulation. A few interesting hazards have been picked, which do or could 
happen. Other things could also be important and suggest specific installation assessments 
consider hazards that relevant to their mission, equipment, operations, and environmental 
influences. These hazards of concern are used to formulate hazard scenarios and determine 
the disruption to a microgrid model during hazard scenario test run simulations. 
4. Step 4: Determine the Level of Disruption 
Hazards of concern were used to develop representative hazard scenarios for the 
RAP applied to these experiments. Several hazards ranging from an isolated equipment 
failure to the destructive paths were formulated into hazard scenarios. The intricate 
scenarios were supplemented with explanatory figures for justifying microgrid components 
affected during a specific hazard scenario. A 24-hour simulation period, facilities, and a 
single ESS (baseline) microgrid component list were used to develop the microgrid state 
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matrix. Finally, critical load facilities and their stakeholder assigned MI values were 
summarized. 
Several scenarios ranging from an isolated equipment failure to the destructive path 
of a tornado are listed in Table 11. 
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Table 11 shows each hazard concern and how it is intended to be represented during 
a simulation. The explosion, tornado, and forest fire scenarios are supplemented with a 
representative figure for justifying components destroyed during the hazard scenario. The 
explosion scenario for the physical impact on the single ESS (baseline) microgrid is shown 
in Figure 35. 
 
Explosion is centered on EP1 Facility and engulfs Generator 2 and the Utility Grid 
Connection. 
Figure 35. Single ESS (Baseline) Microgrid Subjected to Truck Bomb 
Explosion with 600m Blast Radius.  
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Figure 35 represents a truck bomb explosion spanning a blast radius of 600m. Next, 
Figure 36 depicts the hazard scenario damage from the destructive path of a tornado.  
 
The destroyed components include ESS (BT1), bus 2 Controller, Connection between bus 
1 and bus 2, and the PV Array. 
Figure 36. Single ESS Microgrid (Baseline) Subjected to 500m Wide 
Tornado 
101 
Figure 36 shows how the tornado hazard scenario simulates the destruction across 
the entire installation at a 500m wide. Next, the destructive path shown from a forest fire 
hazard scenario is depicted in Figure 37. 
 
Destroyed components include Generator Two (GEN2), Utility Grid Connection (GRID), 
PV Array, and Facility Load EP3. 
Figure 37. Single ESS Microgrid (Baseline) Subjected to a Forest Fire 
Installation Wide by 800m Deep 
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Figure 37 shows how the single ESS (baseline) microgrid components are 
reasonably impacted during a forest fire hazard scenario. When microgrid components are 
simulated to be destroyed, the exact simulation time is based on the microgrid state 
diagram. An application-specific example for the single ESS (baseline) microgrid 
subjected to a forest fire hazard scenario is shown in Figure 38.  
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Example Forest Fire Hazard Scenario simulation the destruction of Generator Two (GEN2), Utility Grid Connection (GRID), PV Array, and 
Facility Load EP3 during hour two of simulation.  
Figure 38. Single ESS (baseline) Microgrid State (St) Diagram Example 
St_B2:BT1 St_B2‐B1 St_B1‐B2 St_B1:EP1 St_B2:EP3 St_B2:EP4 St_B1:EP5 St_B1:EP6 St_B1:GEN1 St_B1:GEN2 St_B2:PV St_B1:UG
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
3 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
4 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
5 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
6 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
7 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
9 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
10 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
11 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
12 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
13 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
14 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
15 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
16 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
17 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
18 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
19 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
20 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
21 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
22 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
23 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0




An hourly timestep frames the application-specific microgrid state diagram from 
Figure 39 within a 24 hour simulation period by the number of microgrid nodes, which 
have their functional state manipulated. The actual microgrid components listed and the 
scenario-based state parameters, St, are outlined during model construction in RAP step 
five. Overall energy deficiencies and direct impacts due to this generator failure are 
propagated through simulation to influence whether certain critical facility loads are met.  
Stakeholder input is required for application-specific quantification of the level of 
a disruption hazard scenario. The Mission Impact (MI) table quantifies the hourly 
disruption for these experiments. The MI table remains consistent with the previous 
Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. The stakeholder assigned MI values are listed in 
Table 12. 
Table 12. Hourly Mission Impact (MI) Assigned for Each Facility. Adapted 




(MI / hour) 
 
10 10 100 200 100 420 
 (Individual MI 
/ Total MI) 
2.4% 2.4% 24% 48% 24% 100% 












Table 12 shows the total hourly and worst-case MI is 420 units per hour for these 
experiments. As previously discussed, the units do not carry an absolute meaning. 
However, to remain compatible with Peterson’s MI values between 0 and 200, MDI’s 0–
100 scale must be multiplied by 2 for MI to align with Peterson’s original 0–200 scale in 
this thesis.MI remains important for these experiments because it determines the disruption 
level and influences facility load allocation in the microgrid controller logic. 
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This section used hazards of concern for developing representative hazard scenarios 
for these experiments. The microgrid state diagram was developed using an hourly timestep 
for a 24-hour simulation period. Finally, stakeholder-assigned MI values conveyed critical 
load facility importance values analogous to the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. 
Additional facility background information is discussed during the simulation model 
developed in the next section. 
5. Step 5: Collect Data via System Model 
An MS Excel-based system model was used for these hazard scenario simulations. 
This section discusses the overall microgrid simulation model structure and then delves 
into overviews of the indices, parameters, variables, objective function, and constraint 
equations critical facility MI assignments. Although the method remains constant from the 
previous chapter, application-specific configurations, parameter sources are explained.  
a. Model Structure 
The microgrid model structure provides the network flow organization to develop 




The microgrid generation source, S, nodes are colored green. The microgrid network sink 
loads, L, are colored orange. The microgrid energy flow boundaries are maintained at the 
BUS and are colored purple. Energy flows from energy generation sources to the microgrid 
BUS and is then applied to loads through blue arrows. Energy transfer between busses is 
represented through light blue arrows. 
Figure 39. Single ESS (Baseline) Microgrid Network Flow Model  
Figure 39 shows each generation source and load connected to the microgrid. The 
notation for this microgrid simulation model commences with specifying the indices in the 
next section. 
b. Indices 
The indices applied to this simulation model include generation source, S, hourly, 
h, facility, F, inbound energy transfer, i, and outbound energy transfer o. Generation 
sources are listed below: 
 1s  : Source 1, Generator 1 
 2s  : Source 2, Generator 2 
 3s  : Source 3, Utility Grid Connection (PCC) 1 
 4s  : Source 4, ESS 1 
 5s  : Source 5, PV Array 1 
 21s i : Inbound energy connection to BUS1 from BUS2 
 12s i : Inbound energy connection to BUS2 from BUS1 
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Hourly timestep, h, ranges from hour one to hour 24 of a simulation and is shown 
below: 
  [1,2,3,...,22,23,24]h : Hourly simulation timestep from hour one to 
hour 24. 
Lastly, facility, f, is used to index the loads attached on the microgrid simulation 
model and are listed below: 
 f = 1 : Facility 1, Small Building (EP1) 
 f = 2 : Facility 2, Small Building (EP3) 
 f = 3 : Facility 3, Medium Building (EP4) 
 f = 4 : Facility 4, Large Building (EP5) 
 f =5 : Facility 5, Warehouse (EP6) 
 f = o12 : Outbound energy connection from BUS1 to BUS2 
 f = o21 : Outbound energy connection from BUS2 to BUS1 
This notation is a repeated convention for associating building MI values and 
energy consumption data from the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model into parameters 
discussed in the next section . 
c. Parameters 
This section identifies fixed systems specification parameters, data-informed 
parameters, and scenario informed parameters for these experiments. The fixed system 
specification parameters were induced from system specification data from the Monterey 
Microgrid Simulation Model. 
Fixed system specification parameters on the load side include accumulating MI 
through MI, M and are shown below: 
 1M   Hourly MI for Facility 1, Small Building EP1 at 10 MI per hour. 
 2M   Hourly MI for Facility 2, Small Building EP3 at 10 MI per hour. 
 3M   Hourly MI for Facility 3, Medium Building EP4 at 100 MI per 
hour. 
 4M   Hourly MI for Facility 4, Large Building EP5 at 200 MI per hour. 
 5M   Hourly MI for Facility 5, Warehouse EP6 at 100 MI per hour. 
108 
The MI values for the fixed specification parameter, M, are informed by Table 12. 
Fixed system specification parameters on the generation side are organized by each 
generation source type. The fossil fuel generator fixed system specification parameters 
provided by the list below: 
 Pw: Generator Power Output Rating (KW) 
 F y : Fuel Tank Capacity (gal) 
 mFl : Minimum Fuel (gal) 
 ( )gene : Energy generation efficiency (gal/KWh) 
Similarly, the ESS fixed system specification parameters are displayed in the 
following bullets: 
 Pd : Discharge rating (KW)  
  MCh : Maximum Charge (KWh) 
 mCh : minimum Charge (KWh) 
 ) (esse : One-way efficiency (KWh/KWh) 
Lastly, PV Array system specification parameters are listed: 
 PVa : Area of Photovoltaic Solar Panels (m2) 
 e(pv) : PV Solar Panels efficiency (Wm2/ Wm2) 
Brief single ESS specifications are shown in Figure 40 for quick comparison 
against follow-on ESS configurations. 
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Figure 40. Single ESS (Baseline) Microgrid ESS, Generator, and PV 
Array Model Specifications 
Figure 40 shows how the overall ESS discharge rating and charge capacity are 
supported by the single ESS. The generator and PV array fixed system parameters, which 
remain constant across each ESS configuration. 
Case-study specific MI, generators, ESS, and PV array fixed system specification 
parameters are summarized with the data-informed parameters involving building energy 


















Fixed system specification parameters and data-informed parameter labels are listed. 
Facility energy consumption data parameters are informed by building data from U.S. DOE 
EERE (2012). PV Array energy output data parameter informed by solar irradiance data 
from NREL (2010). 
Figure 41. Single ESS (Baseline) Formulation Table Excerpt  
Building energy consumption data parameters from Figure 41 share the same 
source as the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model and is intended for building energy 
studies (Peterson 2019). This hourly load data is based on commercial reference buildings 
from the Department of Energy (DOE) (U.S. DOE EERE 2012). Additional hourly energy 
consumption data can be gleaned from DOE commercial reference building models (Deru 
et al. 2011). The specific 24-hour data period is the closest matches the average daily 

























































EP Total represents the sum of energy consumption from each of the five facilities 
modeled. The building location was San Francisco, CA, throughout 2004. Building data 
adapted from (U. S. DOE EERE 2012). 
Figure 42. DOE Building Daily Total Energy Consumption 
Comparison 
Figure 42 shows how the daily energy consumption total of 19,198 KWh on March 
20th was closest to the average of 19,103 KWh for 2004. Unlike a synthetic profile from a 
raw hourly average, this 24-hour simulation data uses March 20th, 2004, to simulate a 
historic hourly energy consumption profile. Consumption profile attributes in the office 
buildings include the typical increase in office building energy consumption during 
weekday working hours.  
Consistent with the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model, solar incidence data is 
sourced from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL 2010). The solar 
incidence data represents a typical year in Monterey, CA. Hourly Direct Normal Irradiance 
(DNI) data was populated from NREL for the same 24-hour period on March 20th, 2004. 
Next, scenario-based parameters were formulated for implementation into the simulation 
model. 
A summary of the scenario-based parameters established from section 4 is shown 
in Figure 43.  
TOTAL Small Office Small Office Medium Office Large Office Warehouse
EP_TOTAL EP1 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6
14‐Jun 14‐Jun 14‐Jun 2‐Jan 14‐Jun 6‐Jan
26321 231 231 2695 22517 825
29‐May 18‐Jun 18‐Jun 29‐May 29‐May 18‐Jun
7097 68 68 594 6124 241
20‐Mar 8‐May 8‐May 2‐Jun 6‐Mar 30‐Jun
19198 190 190 2012 16295 762
Average 










Figure 43. Single ESS (Baseline) Scenario Informed Parameters 
Formulation Summary 
Figure 43 captures the application of Chapter III’s method for modeling MI from 
five facilities and hazard scenario states for each node. Specific node states, St, encompass 
the facilities, generators, ESS, PV array, and utility grid connection. These scenario-based 
parameters were required to model the accumulation of MI and implement hazard scenarios 
for the single ESS (baseline) simulation model. 
Case-study specific parameters involved fixed system specification, data-informed 
parameters, and scenario informed parameters for the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. 
These parameters were necessary for applying realistic behavior to this microgrid 
simulation model. Next, the remaining formulations for variables, objective function and 
constraints are outlined in the next section. 
d. Remaining Single ESS (Baseline) Formulation Summary 
Case-study application of this model formulation primarily involved the differences 
in the indices and parameters discussed in the previous section. The remaining formulation 
utilizes these inputs for developing the microgrid simulation model using the method 
described in Chapter III. This section summarizes the variables and objective function for 
















































the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. Model constraints and other remaining formulation 
details are consistent with the methodology and can be found in MS Excel spreadsheet in 
Chapter  VII. 
Variables specific to the single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation model included 
both DVs and indirect variables. These variables are displayed with the model’s objective 
function in Figure 44. 
 
DVs show both facility load allocation and MI incursion. Indirect variables capture facility 
load consumption, MI accumulation, changes in generator fuel state, and changes in ESS 
state of charge. The configuration specific objective function shows how the MS Excel-
based solver uses facility hourly load allocation , P, to reduce hourly mission impact for 
the five facilities. 







































































 1 [1, , 2,3,..., 22, 23, 24],fh fh fh fhf fMinimize Mi P St M h    
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Figure 44 shows the variables and objective functions required to run the single 
ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation model using an MS Excel-based solver. The 
application-specific objective function includes the load allocation DVs, P, for each 
facility. Energy availability, which limits facility load allocation, is subject to simulation 
model constraints.  
This section outlined the process for developing the single ESS (baseline) specific 
simulation model. The network flow model from Figure 39 formulated the energy flow 
interactions for this model and informed the development of the facility, generation source, 
and hourly timestep indices. Application-specific indices outlined the components of the 
microgrid for applying fixed system specification and data-informed parameters. The 
average daily energy consumption informed the selection of a representative 24 hour 
simulation period. Finally, DVs and indirect variables were summarized with the objective 
function in Figure 44. Single ESS microgrid simulation model formulation specifics can 
be viewed in Chapter  VII. Model validation compared parameters, specifications, power 
flow, and MI results are compared against the Monterey Microgrid MATLAB Model 
during model validation discussed in Chapter V. Results from executing this simulation 
model through the postulated hazard scenarios are presented in the next section. 
6. Step 6: Calculate Consequence and Resilience Metrics 
Consequence and resilience metrics calculations utilize the simulation model test 
run results for each of the hazard scenarios. The resilience measures, MI, average θg. and 
islanding time are calculated for the simulations representing the previously selected 
hazard scenarios. First, a single ESS (baseline) microgrid performance plots are observed 
from an initial test run without hazards. Next, the resilience measures are calculated for 
each of the hazard scenario simulations. Finally, the resilience measures are displayed in 
Figure 46. MI vs. average θg is plotted in Figure 47. The initial test run performance plot 
for the single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation model is shown in Figure 45. 
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The performance plot is shown by the MI is represented from the red-shaded area. Average 
θg is shown through the solid black line. θg influence points are depicted by the magenta 
circles for the dynamically significant periods. Islanding time is shown where the 
performance plot reaches 0% capability. 
Figure 45. Single ESS (Baseline) Microgrid Simulation with No 
Hazards Performance Plot 
Figure 45 shows the single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation’s initial test run 
without hazards applied. This no-hazard simulation is referenced as the highest performing 
test run and serves a control. Subsequent hazard simulations include hazard affected 
components with less favorable resilience measure values.  
The hazard scenarios are listed in Table 11. Hazard implementation was 
represented affecting the simulation from hour 2 through hour 24. Components affected 
characterize the damage from each hazard scenario. Next, the hazard scenarios were 
simulated for calculating MI, average θg, and islanding time. MI, average θg, and islanding 
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time calculations resulted from executing the single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation 
model for each test run. These test results are displayed in Figure 46. 
 
MI, average θg, and islanding time are tabulated for each hazard scenario. Affected 
components initiated during hour two and extended through hour 24 for each hazard 
simulation. 
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5 PV Array 5050 -1.64 16
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Case Study Single ESS (Baseline) Microgrid
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The test results from Figure 46 show the tornado incurs the highest MI of 8760. 
Test run seven also has the most adverse average θg of  -7.66 degrees and the shortest 
islanding time of 7 hours. Next, these MI and θg resilience measures are plotted for each 
test run in Figure 47. 
 
The tagged blue dots show the MI and average θg for each simulation test run. 
Figure 47. Single ESS (Baseline) Microgrid Simulation MI vs. 
Average θg 
The test runs plotted in Figure 47 show how an increase in MI generally correlates 
with a decrease in Average θg. The single ESS failure hazard incurred more MI than the 
single generator failure; but, the single generator failure resulted in a lower average θg. The 
tornado hazard incurred the most MI and had the lowest average θg. 
These consequence and resilience measures from the single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid simulations encompassed a no hazard performance plot, a tabulation of MI, 
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average θg. and islanding time results, and a plot of MI vs. Average θg. Next, system 
improvements from the single ESS (baseline) microgrid are postulated. 
7. Step 7: Evaluate System Improvements 
The final RAP step involves comparing system improvements. For the single ESS 
(baseline) microgrid, postulated resilience improvements include a double ESS and a 
quintuple ESS. These postulations align with this assessment and the thesis’s purpose for 
testing whether distributing ESS results in greater microgrid resilience. The follow-on 
assessments use the resilience measures to compare this single ESS (baseline) microgrid 
against distributed ESS microgrid modifications. 
B. DOUBLE ESS MICROGRID ASSESSMENT 
The RAP assessment for the double ESS microgrid configuration replicated Steps 
1–4 from the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. With resilience goals, measures, and hazards 
unchanged, the double ESS microgrid assessment only required updates to the following 
steps: 
1. Step 5. Collect Data via System Model 
2. Step 6. Calculate Consequences & Resilience Metrics 
3. Step 7. Evaluate System Improvements 
The system model in step 5 incorporates an additional ESS. The resilience measures 
calculated from step 6 supported the improvement evaluation by comparing the double 
ESS microgrid against the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. 
1. Step 5: Collect Data via System Model (Double ESS) 
The indices, parameters, variables, objective function, and constraint equations 
remained consistent with the single ESS (baseline) formulation. Modifications included the 
additional ESS and corresponding ESS capacity and discharge specifications for 
maintaining overall ESS equivalency. The additional ESS formulation is depicted in the 
network flow model shown in Figure 48 
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The microgrid generation source, s, nodes are colored green. The microgrid network sink 
loads, L, are colored orange. The microgrid energy flow boundaries are maintained at the 
BUS and are colored purple. Energy flows from energy generation sources to the microgrid 
BUS and is then applied to loads through blue arrows. Energy transfer between busses is 
represented through light blue arrows. 
Figure 48. Double ESS Microgrid Network Flow Model 
ESS 2 is added to the microgrid BUS 1 in Figure 48. ESS 2 is collocated with 
Facility 1 (EP1) to minimize the physical layout changes from the single ESS (baseline) 
configuration. Individual ESS discharge rating and charge capacity were modified 
according to Figure 49 to maintain overall ESS performance specifications.  
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Figure 49. Double ESS Microgrid Model Specifications 
Figure 49 shows how the overall ESS discharge rating and charge capacity were 
maintained by reducing the individual ESS parameters by 50%. The generator and PV array 
fixed system parameters remain constant across each ESS configuration. 
This section reviewed microgrid simulation model modifications transition from a 
single ESS (baseline) microgrid to a double ESS microgrid. The remaining simulation 
model details are available in VIII. The next section provides results from the double ESS 




























2. Step 6: Calculate Consequence and Resilience Metrics (Double ESS) 
Consequence and resilience metrics calculations for MI, average θg. and islanding 
time were calculated from the test runs representing the same hazard scenarios from the 
single ESS (baseline) tests. Double ESS microgrid performance for an initial no-hazard test 
run are plotted in Figure 50. Next, test run resilience measure results are displayed in Figure 
51. Finally, results are further illuminated through MI vs. average θg plots in Figure 54. 
These resilience measures provided the double ESS microgrid simulation results for 
evaluating system improvements from the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. 
The initial test run performance plot for the double ESS microgrid simulation model 
is shown in Figure 50.  
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The performance plot is shown by the MI is represented from the red-shaded area. Average 
θg is shown through the solid black line. θg influence points are depicted by the magenta 
circles for the dynamically significant periods. Islanding time is shown where the 
performance plot reaches 0% capability. 
Figure 50. Double ESS Microgrid Simulation with No Hazards 
Performance Plot 
Figure 50 shows the double ESS microgrid performance for the initial no-hazard. 
No hazard performance is referenced as the highest performing test run. Subsequent test 
runs include hazard affected components with less favorable resilience measure values. 
Ten simulation test runs implemented the hazards scenarios listed in Table 11. 
The ten hazard simulation test runs are summarized MI, average θg, and islanding 
time are tabulated for each test run. Affected components initiated during hour two and 
extended through hour 24 for each hazard simulation shown in Figure 54.  
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MI, average θg, and islanding time are tabulated for each test run. Affected components 
initiated during hour two and extended through hour 24 for each hazard simulation. 
Figure 51. Double ESS Microgrid Simulation ExperimentResults 
Figure 51 shows how the no hazard test run achieved the most favorable resilience 
measures. Forest Fire hazard simulation incurred the highest MI value of 7060. The dual 
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Double ESS MicrogridSimulation Details
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simulation had the shortest islanding time of 9 hours. Next, the MI and θg resilience 
measures are plotted for each test run in Figure 52.  
 
Tagged green dots show the MI and average θg for each simulation test run. 
Figure 52. Double ESS Microgrid Simulation MI vs. Average θg 
In Figure 52, an increase in MI generally correlated to a decrease in average θg for 
single component failures. The forest fire hazard incurred the most MI; yet, the dual 
generator failure had the lowest average θg. 
These resilience measure calculation results encompassed a no hazard performance 
plot, a tabulation of MI, average θg. and islanding time results, and a plot of MI vs. Average 
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θg. Next, double ESS microgrid results are compared against the single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid results. 
3. Step 7: Evaluate System Improvements (Double ESS) 
This section uses the MI, average θg. and islanding time to compare system 
improvements from the single ESS (baseline) microgrid to the double ESS microgrid. A 
comparison table of resilience measures for both configurations illuminates the favorable 
resilience measure for each test. Next single ESS (baseline) and double ESS MI vs. 
Average θg plot points are paired for further comparison and evaluation. This evaluation 
determined the efficacy of distributing ESS from a single ESS (baseline) microgrid to a 
double ESS microgrid. 
The resilience measure comparisons between the single ESS (baseline) microgrid 
and the double ESS microgrid are shown in  Figure 53. 
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The most favorable resilience measure results are highlighted in green. The least favorable 
resilience measure values are highlighted in red. Neutral resilience measure values that do 
not fall under the previous two categories are highlighted in yellow. Less MI is better 
because it indicates a shorter outage duration for critical loads. A θg value closer to 0-
degrees is more desirable because it indicates less drastic drops in the microgrid’s ability 
to serve critical loads. This table shows that the double ESS microgrid architecture has the 
greatest resilience for the nine hazard scenarios simulated. The hazard involving 
geographic events forest fires, the double ESS architecture performs worse than the single 
ESS architecture due to the distributed ESS being within the area impacted by the hazard.  
Figure 53. Single ESS (Baseline) Microgrid vs. Double ESS 
Microgrid Resilience Measure Comparison 
Across the results from Figure 53, the single ESS (baseline) microgrid had only one 
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ESS microgrid has eight test runs with a more favorable average θg. The forest fire 
engulfing ESS 2 provided the only hazard where the single ESS (baseline) microgrid had 
a longer islanding time. Next, average θg is plotted against MI in Figure 54.  
 
Blue squares represent scenario data points for single ESS (baseline) microgrid average θg 
vs. MI. Green squares represent scenario data points for double ESS microgrid average θg 
vs. MI. Orange pairing lines connect results from both microgrid results for each test run. 
Figure 54. Average θg vs. Mission Impact For Single ESS (Baseline) 
Compared Against Double ESS Microgrid 
Figure 54 indicates more considerable differences in resilience results between 
microgrids during instances with less favorable resilience measures. Conversely, resilience 
measure differences were smaller where average θg was shallow, and MI was low. The 
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single ESS (baseline) microgrid data points are predominately lower on the chart and 
further to the right compared to the double ESS microgrid. This average θg vs. MI 
comparison indicates that the double ESS microgrid generally had greater resilience than 
the single ESS (baseline) microgrid for these hazard scenarios. 
This evaluation showed double ESS microgrid had greater resilience compared to 
the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. The single ESS (baseline) microgrid configuration 
only showed increased resilience when the ESS 2 from the double ESS microgrid was 
affected in the forest fire hazard scenario. MI, average θg, and islanding time resilience 
measure results favored the double ESS microgrid. Overall, the single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid more resilient when measured using two out of three resilience measures. The 
next microgrid assessment includes the quintuple ESS microgrid. 
C. QUINTUPLE ESS MICROGRID ASSESSMENT 
The RAP assessment for the quintuple ESS microgrid configuration utilized Steps 
1–3 from the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. Spatially significant hazards (e.g., explosion, 
tornado, and forest fire) were reevaluated to account for reasonable architectural changes 
when distributing an ESS to each of the five facilities. Individual facility boundaries were 
required to enable a facility to utilize their newly collocated ESS during instances of 
isolation directly. The quintuple ESS microgrid energy flow model is discussed during the 
system model. With resilience goals, and measures unchanged, the quintuple ESS 
microgrid assessment only required updates to the following steps: 
1. Step 4: Determine Level of Disruption 
2. Step 5. Collect Data via System Model 
3. Step 6. Calculate Consequences & Resilience Metrics 
4. Step 7. Evaluate System Improvements 
The resilience measures calculated from step 6 provided MI, average θg, and 
islanding time resilience measure results for each simulation test runs. Step 7 used these 
results for comparing the quintuple ESS microgrid resilience against both the single ESS 
(baseline) and double ESS microgrids. 
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1. Step 4: Determine Level of Disruption 
The original eight hazard scenarios ranging from an isolated equipment failure to 
the destructive path of a tornado are listed in Table 11. Although each facility location 
remained unchanged, ESS distribution involved the creation of a facility-specific bus and 
ESS for each of the five facilities. Microgrid bus boundaries for each facility enabled them 
to utilize their collocated ESS when isolated. Updates to the affected components due to 
this reorganization are shown in Figure 55. Justification for each update includes an 
explanatory figure for spatially specific hazard scenarios (e.g., explosion, tornado, and 
forest fire). Critical load facilities, facility locations, and stakeholder assigned MI values 
remain unchanged. Based on the physical location updates from distributing ESS and 
associating generation sources to the nearest facility, affected components were updated 
for the relevant hazard scenarios. The quintuple ESS simulation scenarios with affected 
components are displayed in Figure 55. 
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Hazard scenarios are implemented from hour 2 through hour 24 for each test run. 
Components affected has been updated to correlate damage from each hazard scenario to 
the Quintuple ESS Microgrid Physical Layout 
Figure 55. Quintuple ESS Microgrid Simulation Experiment Test 
Runs 
Figure 55 shows how the bus isolation, explosion, tornado, and forest fires hazard 
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was updated from two buses to all five buses implement the hazard scenario of 
simultaneous isolation to each facility on the quintuple ESS microgrid. Justification for 
updates to components affected by the explosion hazard is shown in Figure 56. 
 
The red circle depicts the blast radius engulfing the collocated ESS 1, bus 1, and Facility 
1. Null values to bus connections from bus 2 to bus 1 and bus 1 to bus 5 indicated they are 
inoperable due to the hazard. 
Figure 56. Quintuple ESS Microgrid Subjected to Truck Bomb Hazard 


































Beyond the explosion, Figure 56 shows how each facility includes an ESS and bus. 
Additionally, generation sources involving the generators, PV array, and grid connection 
were incorporated into the quintuple ESS microgrid through placement at specific 
facilities. Generator 1 was tied to bus 3 collocated with ESS 3 and facility 3. Generator 2 
was tied to bus 4 collocated with ESS 4 and facility 4. Lastly, the PV array and utility grid 
connection were tied to bus 5 collocated with ESS 5 and facility 5. These generation source 
placements update the components affected by the tornado hazard shown in Figure 57. 
 
Figure 57. Quintuple ESS Microgrid Subjected to 500m Wide 
Tornado Path 
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Figure 57 shows how the tornado hazard only affects connections between bus 1 to 
bus 2 and bus 3 to bus 4. Since the quintuple ESS microgrid inter-bus connections are 
organized in a ring, buses 1 4 and 5 continue to interface in the top section while buses 2 
and 3 continue to interface in the bottom section. The forest fire hazard is shown in  
Figure 58.  
 
Figure 58. Quintuple ESS Microgrid Subjected to Forest Fire 
Installation Wide by 800m Deep 
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Figure 58 shows how the forest fire now affects ESS 2, bus 2, facility 2, and inter-
bus connections between bus 1 and bus 2 and bus 2 to bus 3. This ring architecture allows 
bus 1 and bus 3 to remain connected to the other unaffected buses on the microgrid.  
Although facility locations remained unchanged, pairing an ESS to each facility 
required a separate bus for each facility. This requirement drove the collocation of the 
remaining energy generation sources to a facility bus. The location updates and increased 
inter-bus connections invoked the reassessment of affected components for the quintuple 
ESS microgrid.  
Hazard scenarios are implemented from hour 2 through hour 24 for each test run. 
Components affected has been updated to correlate damage from each hazard scenario to 
the Quintuple ESS Microgrid Physical Layout 
Figure 55 shows the updated components affected. Hazards representations from  
Figure 57 and Figure 58 showed how an increased number of buses reduced 
component isolation. Formulation updates associated with these increased inter-bus 
connections are further discussed during the quintuple ESS microgrid system model. 
2. Step 5: Collect Data via System Model (Quintuple ESS) 
Facility-collocated buses and associated inter-bus connections increased the 
complexity of the simulation model for the quintuple ESS microgrid. Although the method 
remains consistent with the previous chapter, application-specific configurations are 
discussed. The increased complexity from a single bus 1 to bus 2 connection to five buses 
spawned increased connection combinations requiring architectural decisions. For 
example, there are very few combinations when connecting only two buses. Conversely, 
the connection of five buses opens an architecture gateway. The architecture adopted for 
connecting these five buses represented a ring connecting to their adjacent neighbor. This 
ring architecture is displayed in Figure 59. 
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The microgrid generation source, S, nodes are colored green. The microgrid network sink 
loads, L, are colored orange. The microgrid energy flow boundaries are maintained at the 
bus and are colored purple. Energy flows from energy generation sources to the microgrid 
bus and is then applied to loads through blue arrows. Energy transfer between busses is 
represented through light blue arrows. 
Figure 59. Quintuple ESS Microgrid Network Flow Model 
Figure 59 organizes the quintuple ESS microgrid simulation model formulation. 
The ring-type organization of inter-bus connections is depicted from the top of bus 1 down 
to bus 5 and then back to up to bus 1. Individual ESS discharge rating and charge capacity 




Figure 60. Quintuple ESS Microgrid Model Specifications 
Figure 60 shows how the overall ESS discharge rating and charge capacity were 
maintained by reducing the individual ESS parameters to 20%. The generator and PV array 
fixed system parameters were not affected. 
This section reviewed microgrid simulation model modifications model the 
quintuple ESS microgrid. These modifications were required for developing a simulation 
model with distributed ESS. The remaining modifications are captured in the MS Excel 
data in Chapter IX. The next section provides resilience measure test results from the 
quintuple ESS simulation. 
3. Step 6: Calculate Consequence and Resilience Metrics (Quintuple ESS) 
Consequence and resilience metrics calculations for MI, average θg, and islanding 
time were calculated from the test runs representing hazard scenarios from the previous 
microgrid simulation models. Quintuple ESS microgrid performance for an initial no-
hazard test run was plotted in Figure 61. Next, test run resilience measure results were 

















plots of MI vs. average θg in Figure 63. This collection of resilience measures provided the 
quintuple ESS microgrid simulation results for evaluating system improvements used for 
evaluating system improvements against the previous microgrid configurations. 
The initial test run performance plot for the quintuple ESS microgrid simulation 
model is shown in Figure 61. 
 
No hazards were applied. The performance plot is shown by the MI is represented from the 
red-shaded area. Average θg is plotted as a solid black glideslope line. θg influence points 
are depicted by the magenta triangles for the operating periods prior to null performance. 
Islanding time is shown to exceed the 24-hour simulation period. 
Figure 61. Quintuple ESS Microgrid Simulation with No Hazards 
Performance Plot 
Figure 61 shows the quintuple ESS microgrid performance for the initial no-hazard. 
No-hazard performance was referenced as a control and the highest performing test run. 
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Subsequent test runs included hazard affected components with less favorable resilience 
measure values. Ten simulation test runs implemented the hazards scenarios listed in  
Table 10. Results from the ten hazard simulation test runs are summarized in Figure 62. 
 
MI, average θg, and islanding time are tabulated for each test run. Affected components 
initiated during hour two and extended through hour 24 for each hazard simulation. 
Figure 62. Quintuple ESS Microgrid Simulation Experiment Results 
Figure 63 shows the PV Array failure hazard simulation achieved the most 
favorable resilience measures and even matched the no hazard run. This match highlights 
microgrid controller logic limitations for the quintuple ESS microgrid. Controller logic 
improvement opportunities are further illuminated by the bus isolations induced from the 
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discussed as simulation model limitations in the model validation Chapter  V. The dual 
generator failure hazard simulation had the least favorable average θg of -3.24. The MI and 
θg resilience measures are plotted for each of the simulation test runs in Figure 63. 
 
Tagged orange dots show the MI and average θg for each simulation test run. data callouts 
suplement quintuple ESS microgrid dots that show increased significance. 
Figure 63. Quintuple ESS Microgrid Simulation MI vs. Average θg 
Figure 63 depicts similar results for both average MI and θg. These similar 
performance results across the variety of hazard simulations suggest the quintuple ESS 
microgrid performance is less affected.  
These resilience measure calculation results encompassed a no hazard performance 
plot, a tabulation of MI, average θg. and islanding time results, and a plot of MI vs. Average 
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θg. Next, quintuple ESS microgrid results are compared against both the double ESS 
microgrid and single ESS (baseline) microgrid results. 
4. Step 7: Evaluate System Improvements (Quintuple ESS) 
This improvement evaluation uses MI, average θg. and islanding time to compare 
quintuple ESS microgrid against both the single ESS (baseline) microgrid and double ESS 
microgrid. A comparison table of resilience measures for both configurations illuminates 
the favorable resilience measure for each configuration for each simulation. Next, MI vs. 
Average θg plot points are paired for each microgrid for further comparison and evaluation. 
This evaluation illuminated that microgrid resilience was improved from distributing ESS 
to a quintuple ESS microgrid configuration. 
The resilience measure comparisons between the three microgrid configurations are 
shown in Figure 64. 
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The most favorable resilience measure results are highlighted in green. The least favorable 
resilience measure values are highlighted in red. Neutral resilience measure values that do 
not fall under the previous two categories are highlighted in yellow. Less MI is better 
because it indicates a shorter outage duration for critical loads. A θg value closer to 0-
degrees is more desirable because it indicates less drastic drops in the microgrid’s ability 
to serve critical loads. This table shows that the quintuple ESS microgrid architecture has 
the greatest resilience for the ten hazard scenarios simulated. Note that for hazards 
involving geographic events such as tornados and forest fires, the double ESS architecture 
can perform worse than the single ESS architecture due to the distributed ESS being within 
the area impacted by the hazard.  
Figure 64. Three Microgrid Architectures’ Resilience Compared 
Across Several Hazard Scenarios Where the Quintuple ESS Architecture 
is Identified as the Most Resilient  
Figure 64 shows how the quintuple ESS microgrid architecture achieves the most 
favorable resilience measures for every hazard scenario. The largest resilience 
improvement—from the single ESS (baseline) microgrid to the distributed quintuple ESS 
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tornado hazard scenario, the quintuple ESS microgrid achieves an MI reduction of 57% 
from the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. This MI improvement is equivalent to the most 
mission-dependent building—the Large Building EP5 at 200 MI per hour—gaining an 
additional 25 hours of power for EP5’s critical load. The tornado hazard scenario also 
shows the quintuple ESS microgrid architecture average θg is -1.59-degrees, indicating a 
79% less drastic performance loss than the single ESS (baseline) microgrid architecture 
with an average θg of -7.66-degrees. Islanding time for the quintuple ESS microgrid 
architecture is >24 hours across all scenarios. Conversely, the single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid architecture has seven scenarios with less than 17 hours of islanding time. The 
double ESS microgrid generally has slightly more favorable resilience measures than the 
single ESS, except during the forest fire hazard scenario that engulfs the 2nd ESS. The 
quintuple ESS superior performance in the no-hazard test run illuminates microgrid control 
logic improvement opportunities. Next, average θg is plotted against MI for all three 
microgrid configurations in Figure 65. 
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The blue dots represent the single ESS (baseline) microgrid. The green dots represent the 
double ESS microgrid. The orange dots represent the quintuple ESS microgrid. Orange 
pairing lines and data callouts connect and illuminate for hazard simulations with highly 
varying results across the different ESS configurations. The top of the chart indicates the 
most favorable value of average θg. The left of the chart indicates the most favorable value 
of MI. The top left of the chart is colored green to indicate the most favorable region. 
Figure 65. Single ESS (Baseline), Double ESS, and Quintuple ESS 
Microgrid MI vs. Average θg 
Figure 65 shows how the quintuple ESS microgrid resilience measures remained 
more favorable and varied less than the other microgrids. The quintuple ESS microgrid had 
significantly more favorable MI and Average θg results for the dual generator failure hazard 
simulation. This plot interpretation indicated the quintuple ESS microgrid had 
predominately greater resilience and had less varying resilience measure results across the 
different hazard scenarios.  
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This evaluation indicated the quintuple ESS microgrid had greater resilience to the 
hazard scenarios than the double ESS microgrid and single ESS (baseline) microgrid. MI, 
average θg, and islanding time resilience measure results favored the quintuple ESS 
microgrid except when all ESSs had failed. Overall, this evaluation concluded the 
quintuple ESS has greater resilience to the simulated hazards scenarios in Table 11.  
D. CENTRALIZED VS. DISTRIBUTED ESS EXPERIMENTATION 
SUMMARY 
These experiments utilized a modified RAP method detailed in the previous chapter 
for testing whether distributing ESS results in greater resilience in microgrids (Vugrin, 
Castillo and Silva-Monroy 2017). The RAP application encompassed hazard simulations 
to single ESS (baseline), double ESS, and quintuple ESS microgrid configurations. A 
resilience goal, purposed to persevere mission capability, invoked selection of resilience 
measures MI, average θg, and islanding time. Peterson’s facility-specific MI values (2019) 
provided a consequence category measure. Facility energy consumption data-informed was 
informed by building data from U.S. DOE EERE (2012). Nominal hazards of concern 
influenced scenario development. Hazard scenarios framed ten test runs and instrumented, 
which microgrid components were affected. Peterson’s Monterey Microgrid Simulation 
Model (2019) was reengineered using MS Excel to represent the single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid. Hazard simulation test runs produced MI, average, θg, and islanding time 
resilience measure evaluation results. RAP iterations after the single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid involved a double ESS microgrid and then a quintuple ESS microgrid for 
evaluating system improvements. Total ESS storage capacity and output were held 
constant. In the quintuple ESS, ESS was distributed to each of the facilities and increased 
inter-bus connections from one to five in an evolved architecture. Two scenarios that show 
the greatest resilience improvement are tornado and dual generator failure hazard 
scenarios. The tornado hazard scenario shows distributing quintuple ESS improves MI by 
57%, average θg by 79%, and islanding time by 17 hours. In the dual generator failure 
hazard scenario, distributing quintuple ESS improved MI by 35%, average θg by 51%, and 
islanding time by 15 hours. Thus, decentralizing ESS demonstrates a greater ability to 
continue to provide power to facilities during every hazard simulation. The quintuple ESS 
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microgrid RAP showed greater resilience across all hazard scenarios. This comparative 
analysis not only indicated the quintuple ESS microgrid had the greatest resilience for the 
hazards scenario simulations presented but also demonstrated that distributing ESS resulted 
in greater resilience for these microgrids. Next, the MS Excel model’s validation involved 
further comparison against the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model Microgrid in 
Chapter V.  
  
146 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
147 
V. MODEL VALIDATION   
This section provides a high-level review of the simulation results and discusses 
the MS Excel-based model’s implications to conduct the hazard scenario simulation test 
runs. The simulation results discussed here have been useful for comparing equivalent 
microgrids models with different ESS distribution levels in the previous chapter. Further 
model validation is supported by comparing the MS Excel-based single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid simulation model and Peterson’s MATLAB based Monterey Microgrid 
Simulation Model (2019). The MS Excel-based single ESS (baseline) microgrid model 
exhibited accurate energy flows but yielded less favorable MI. This MI shortcoming was 
attributed to differences in load shedding behavior in the modified microgrid control logic. 
These limitations were accepted because this same microgrid control logic expanded the 
solution space to utilize load paths that emerged from the distributed ESS network from 
the experiments. For increasing resilience gains from distributing ESS, control logic 
improvement opportunities are reviewed with simulation instances. 
A. COMPARISON AGAINST MONTEREY MATLAB SIMULATION 
MODEL  
The MS Excel-based single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation model was 
compared against the MATLAB-based Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model (2019). 
First, model specifications were compared between MS Excel-based single ESS (baseline) 
microgrid simulation model and Peterson’s MATLAB-based Monterey Microgrid 
Simulation Model (2019). Next, modifications to the Monterey Microgrid Simulation 
Model’s data selection, simulation period, and removal of additional features (e.g., 
generator fuel resupply) were justified. Differences in MI, building-specific load shed 
hours, and microgrid energy flows validated the single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation 
model. Minor differences in load shed hours and MI indicated a slight deficiency in the 
new microgrid control logic.  
The single ESS (baseline) microgrid model matched the two-bus physical 
architecture, timestep behavior, system specifications, and load consumption data and 
148 
environmental data to the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. Additional 
commonalities included binary MI attribution for unpowered facilities, identical generator 
specifications and control, and binary component failure representations. The remaining 
differences include microgrid controller logic and BUS-central ESS charging. For 
equivalent comparison, modifications to the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model 
encompassed an identical 24-hour test period data parameter inputs for solar irradiance and 
total building energy consumption. This section displays equivalent specifications, 
correlating power flow diagrams, and comparable MI results for both single ESS 
simulation models. Comparable behavior through facility outage durations, power flow, 
generator fuel consumption, and MI validate this new single ESS (baseline) model. 
Identical generator, PV array, and ESS performance specifications were required 
for comparing the single ESS (baseline) model against the Monterey Microgrid Simulation 
model. A direct readout from this MATLAB model is shown in Figure 66. 
 
Figure 66. Performance Specification MATLAB Readout from 
MGSimMCSetting.csv in Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. Source: 
Peterson (2019). 
Figure 66 shows the fixed system specification parameters for the PV array, 
generator and ESS 1, regarded as BT1, for the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. 
Generator refueling was altered to not occur until after the 24-hour simulation period and 
was also disabled. The normal ESS output of 300 KW per hour was increased to 800 KW 
per hour to avoid an MI totaling issue when an ESS is not depleted on the Monterey 
Microgrid Simulation Model. Increasing ESS output from 300 to 800 KW per hour 
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increased MI from an unrealistic 150 units where ESS charge exceeded 24 hours to 3380 
MI when the microgrid ceased to provide power by hour 17. Next, a screenshot of the MS 
Excel-based single ESS (baseline) microgrid fixed system specifications settings is shown 
in Figure 67. 
 
Modifications to the experiment version of the single ESS (baseline) microgrid model 
included the ESS output increase to match the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model’s 
800 KW per hour discharge rating.  
Figure 67. Performance Specifications MS Excel Spreadsheet 
Screenshot from the Single (ESS) Baseline Microgrid Simulation Model 
The PV array, generators, and ESS capacity specifications, displayed in Figure 67, 
match the MATLAB readout in Figure 66. This indicates equivalent fixed system 
performance specifications between the MATLAB-based Monterey Microgrid Simulation 
model and the MS Excel-based single ESS (baseline) simulation model. Next, power flow 




















The microgrid power flow readout from a no hazard test run of the Monterey 
Microgrid Simulation Model is shown in Figure 68. 
 
Hourly building energy consumption is plotted above the x-axis. Conversely, energy 
generation is plotted below the x-axis. The data point flag at (16,0) shows null values for 
energy consumption or generation during hour 16 of simulation. The data point flag at (12, 
0) corresponds to generator fuel depleted. The data point flag at (14, 217) corresponds to 
when ESS was depleted below 0%.  
Figure 68. Power Flow Readout from Monterey Microgrid Simulation 
Model. Source: Peterson (2019).  
The islanding time for Figure 68 is depicted as 15 hours. The generators exhausted 
fuel storage during hour 12. The ESS was unrealistically depleted below 0% in hour 14. 
This unrealistic ESS depletion below 0% charge is a minor flaw in the Monterey Microgrid 
Simulation Model, which only marginally inflates MI. Comparatively, the single ESS 
(baseline) microgrid simulation model power flow results are shown in Figure 69. 
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Hourly building energy consumption is plotted above the x-axis. Conversely, energy 
generation is plotted below the x-axis. Sunset and null values for energy consumption 
occurred at hour 17 of simulation. Generator fuel was completed consumed at hour 10. 
ESS charge was depleted at hour 13. Islanding time of 17 hours is 6% better than the 
Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. 
Figure 69. Excel-Based Single ESS Microgrid Simulation Power Flow 
Figure 69 shows how the MS Excel-based single ESS microgrid power flow 
realistically matches the power flow from the MATLAB based Monterey Microgrid 
Simulation Model. Overall energy generation from the ESS, generators, and PV array 
exude similar behavior. This comparable power flow behavior validated the Excel-based 
single ESS microgrid simulation model’s energy generation and consumption behavior. 
Minor differences in generator fuel consumption, ESS depletion and load allocation are 
attributed to microgrid control logic limitations with the MS Excel-based single ESS 
microgrid model. Specifically, the load shedding of EP4 from hour 10 through 13 and EP6 
during hour 12 were suboptimal load shedding decisions by the Excel-based model in 
Figure 69. Islanding time of 17 hours is 6% better than the Monterey Microgrid Simulation 
Model. 
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This power flow comparison demonstrates realistic microgrid flow behavior for 
validating the MS Excel-based single ESS microgrid simulation model. The microgrid 
control logic differences are further illuminated through resilience measure comparison. 
MI results and other operating parameters from the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model 
are shown in Figure 70. 
 
MI readout indicates 3800. 
Figure 70. Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model No-Hazard Results. 
Source: Peterson (2019).  
These simulation results are compared to the MS Excel-based single ESS microgrid 
model readout shown in Figure 71. 
 
MI readout indicates 4580. 
Figure 71. MS Excel–Based Single ESS Microgrid Simulation Model 
No-Hazard Results 
Figure 71 shows a 21% MI difference compared to Monterey Microgrid Simulation 
Model. These comparable results further validated the functionality of the MS Excel-based 
single ESS microgrid simulation model. Still, they continued to illuminate a microgrid 
control logic deficiency for the single ESS configuration at a 21% increase in MI. 
The MATLAB-based microgrid control logic utilized a linear solver programmed 
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The precedence list was programmed based on load importance. For each timestep, this 
preprogrammed power allocation pattern expedited the calculation through a narrow search 
area enabling use for life-cycle MI analysis spanning thousands of test runs. A sequence of 
ranked MI buildings enabled the use of a linear solver, which guaranteed global 
optimization for the narrow problem formulated. However, this seemingly global solution 
was bounded by the limitations of this precedence list. Power to combinations of lower 
priority buildings is not available when using the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model’s 
microgrid control logic until after the preceding facility was considered. Microgrid control 
logic improvements to the MS Excel-based single ESS simulation model included the 
abolishment of this load priority precedence list.   
For equivalent comparison, modifications to the Monterey Microgrid Simulation 
Model encompassed an identical 24-hour test period, scenario and total building energy 
consumption. This section displays equivalent specifications, correlating power flow 
diagrams, and comparable MI results for both single ESS simulation models. Comparable 
behavior through facility outage durations, power flow, generator fuel consumption, and 
MI validate this new single ESS (baseline) model. The next section reviews the MS Excel 
solver limitations associated with the single ESS (baseline) simulation model. 
B. MICROGRID CONTROL LOGIC LIMITATIONS 
Removing the load shed precedence list in the Monterey Microgrid Simulation 
Model’s microgrid controller logic expanded the solution space for the MS Excel-based 
single ESS (baseline), double ESS, and quintuple ESS simulation models. These expanded 
combinations of solutions required a non-linear solver only able to find locally optimal 
solutions to the objective function. This section reviews resilience performance, microgrid 
power flows, and ESS charge trackers for simulation runs where microgrid control logic 
impeded microgrid resilience. The source of these impediments encompassed microgrid 
control logic from the macro-enforced constraints and the MS Excel GRG non-linear solver 
limitations. Human-in-the-loop is prescribed as an operator-driven solution for guiding 
load shed priorities and modulating a disruption measure, such as MI, to influence the 
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solver’s objective function for maneuvering the energy generation and allocation 
throughout a microgrid.  
A useful indicator for illuminating improved microgrid control logic opportunities 
involves a plot comparing the total hourly energy generated vs. total hourly energy 
consumed. A plot of energy generation vs. consumption is shown in Figure 72. 
 
Figure 72. Total Energy Generation and Consumption for Single ESS 
(Baseline) Microgrid with No Hazard 
Figure 72 depicts differences in generation vs. consumption, which indicate 
insufficient optimization through the gap between the red bars and the top of the green-
shaded area. Simulation hour 10 had an opportunity to allocate energy to facilities 1 and 2. 
There were also generator and ESS throttling opportunities to minimize energy generated 
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during hours 13–16, which may have yielded more favorable MI. The single ESS instance, 
microgrid control logic would have benefited from a load priority precedence list. The 
single ESS (baseline) microgrid was still able to utilize and fully deplete it’s ESS. Complete 
ESS utilization was not realized by the quintuple ESS microgrid that achieved greater 
resilience.  
A second illuminator of microgrid control logic improvement opportunities 
involves the lack of complete ESS utilization during the most resilient quintuple ESS 
microgrid. The PV array failure simulation run had the most favorable resilience results 
across every hazard simulation per Figure 64. Comparatively, the Monterey Microgrid 
Simulation Model, with a PV array failure, only achieved an islanding time of 12 hours 
with an MI of 5,460. Conversely, the quintuple ESS microgrid achieved an islanding time 
of >24 hours and an MI value of 3,780, which is a 44% MI improvement from the Monterey 
Microgrid Simulation Model from Figure 70. The quintuple ESS microgrid achieved this 
result without depleting all five ESS shown in Figure 73.3780. 
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Figure 73. Quintuple ESS Microgrid’s 5 x ESS Charge Tracker for PV 
Array Failure Hazard Simulation 
The ESS utilization concern from Figure 73 could be attributed to the macro 
enforced constraints control logic and parameters for the GRG nonlinear solver. Increasing 
the MS Excel solver optimality tolerances beyond 0.0001 did not fix this ESS utilization 
issue. An example of a control logic flaw in the quintuple ESS microgrid control logic 
involved an inability for individual facilities to utilize their ESS until load demand 
exceeded the generator output ratings per Figure 23. 
This section presented microgrid control logic limitations associated with the MS 
Excel-based microgrid simulation models. Inefficient load generation vs. consumption and 
ESS utilization were reviewed as evidence of microgrid control logic limitations. A known 
ESS utilization issue was discussed as an example where the microgrid control logic 
impeded an intuitively better solution. There are at least two paths for improving the 
microgrid control logic presented. The logic could re-designed around the quintuple ESS 
microgrid architecture; or, human-in-the-loop interactions could be incorporated to enable 
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the realization of intuitive adjustments by a microgrid operator. Next, the disadvantages of 
this MS Excel-based simulation model are discussed.  
C. MS EXCEL LIMITATIONS 
MS Excel-based simulation model limitations for solver input sizes, calculation 
time, spreadsheet size, and absolute cell references confine the utility of the MS Excel tool 
developed as part of this research to narrow incremental improvements of relatively simple 
microgrids. Frontline Solver’s upgraded product offers a 500 non-linear decision variable 
limit compared to the 200-variable limit associated with standard MS Excel Solver. 
Twenty-six decision variables are the maximum requirement for models in this research. 
Simulation execution is limited by each timestep solver calculation ranging from 10 
seconds on the single ESS to 1 minute on the quintuple ESS. 24-hour hazard simulation 
periods take a nominal home use computer up to 10minutes for each test run. Improved 
computer hardware or solver program could shorten the hazard simulation calculation 
times and could potentially enable a 14-day simulation period consistent with DOD energy 
security expectations from Chapter I. Finally, the spreadsheet size populated by each 
model’s parameters and variables extends beyond 40 rows by 40 columns. Jump-to macros 
enable quick relocations to each microgrid component, and a separate decision variable 
notation card enables accurate cell references when coding the Excel macro. Lastly, a 
macro-driven solver requires absolute cell locations. 
Consequently, spreadsheet cell relocations require repopulation of each parameter 
and variable utilized by macro logic and solver. These Excel simulation model limitations 
do not preclude resilience evaluation of the ESS configurations examined in this research. 
Excel’s most impeding limitation is solver time, but it could be improved with upgraded 
computer hardware enabling exploration of a 14-day simulation period. 
D. SUMMARY 
The single ESS (baseline) MS Excel simulation model was validated through an 
equivalent specification comparison against the MATLAB-based Monterey Microgrid 
Simulation Model (Peterson 2019). Microgrid simulation behavior was sufficiently 
comparable, but; microgrid controller logic modifications produced less favorable MI 
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values compared to the MATLAB-based Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model. 
Controller logic was modified from a preprogrammed precedence list permitting a linear 
solver to increased load allocation and energy generation decision variables requiring MS 
Excel’s GRG non-linear solver. Local non-linear solutions from MS Excel incurred less 
favorable MI results for this single ESS microgrid. Since a global solution can only be 
more favorable than a local solution,  non-linear solver results remain sufficiently valid for 
testing for a resilience increase. Quantifying resilience increases would reasonably require 
global solutions from simulation runs and uncertainty analysis. Despite these control logic 
deficiencies, the quintuple ESS microgrid achieved the most favorable resilience measures 
across every model tested in this, including the Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model . 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS  
The answer to the research question of “does distributed energy storage lead to 
increased microgrid resilience” is yes. ESS was distributed from the centralized single ESS 
(baseline) microgrid to a double ESS microgrid and then a Quintuple ESS microgrid. 
Everything was held constant except for increased ESS distribution and increased 
connections. The thesis results indicate distributed energy storage leads to increased 
microgrid resilience. Two scenarios that show the greatest resilience improvement are 
tornado and dual generator failure hazard scenarios. The tornado hazard scenario shows 
distributing quintuple ESS improves MI by 57%, average θg by 79%, and islanding time 
by 17 hours. In the dual generator failure hazard scenario, distributing quintuple ESS 
improved MI by 35%, average θg by 51%, and islanding time by 15 hours. Thus, 
decentralizing ESS demonstrates a greater ability to continue to provide power to facilities 
during every hazard simulated. Further details are discussed in the following paragraphs, 
followed by future work. 
This research answers whether distributing ESS results in greater resilience in 
microgrids. The architecture informed the stress-strain behavior perspective on resilience, 
from Taft (2018), and the JCIDS definition of a capability (2015) influenced an attribute-
based deterministic definition of resilience. The importance of quantifying capability 
influenced the selection of resilience measures MI and islanding time  (Van Broekhoven 
et al. 2012). MI was modified to a percentage of current MI over the worst-case MI value 
to indicate each simulation timestep’s performance level. The third resilience measure, 
average θg, illuminated resilient behavior by measuring the change in capability percentage 
for each simulation timestep after an initiating event. Sandia National Lab’s resilience 
analysis process (RAP) guided the evaluation for testing resilience improvements through 
different ESS distribution levels. The case-study implemented this RAP for single ESS 
(baseline), double ESS and quintuple ESS variations of the microgrid used in the Monterey 
Microgrid Simulation Model. The deterministic MS Excel-based simulation model utilized 
an hourly timestep, a 24-hour simulation period, and the resilience measures MI, average 
θg, and islanding time. Test runs were informed by generalized hazard scenarios ranging 
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from individual component failures to destructive zones (e.g., explosions, tornados, forest 
fires). These RAP evaluations identified greater overall resilience in microgrids with 
distributed ESS through simulation. Distributing ESS to each facility inherently increased 
the quantity of ESS and load paths. Improved microgrid architecture, woven by increased 
inter-bus connections and energy flow combinations, even improved resilience to non-
spatial hazard scenarios (e.g., individual component failures). Distributing ESS increased 
energy pathways and expanded the energy allocation solution space for greater resilience 
in microgrids. Distributed ESS, architected to increase energy pathways, resulted in greater 
resilience in microgrids.  
Costs, microgrid component sizing, and implementation tradeoffs have not been 
investigated. Increasing overall specifications, such as total ESS capacity and total power 
output capabilities, were not explored to avoid costing variations. A specific installation 
conducting this resilience assessment should ensure their tenant organizations are included 
when associating organizational impacts to different microgrids configurations. Feedback 
from actual tenant organizations with timestep indications for when their facility was 
impacted could improve the association between microgrid sizing and facility impacts 
during hazard simulations. Feedback informed hazard simulations would improve the 
analysis of different ESS configurations and aid in exploring benefits in advanced 
microgrid architecture (i.e., ring-bus, mesh networks). The inclusion of installation 
leadership and tenant organization feedback will bridge expectations to the decision-
makers balancing costs and tradeoffs. Bridging expectations through simulation results 
guides ESS distribution in realizing resilience improvement goals and exposes tenant 
organization leadership to plausible outcomes should these ever hazards occur. 
A. DISCUSSION 
The RAP and hazard simulation method used in this research shows promise for 
the early exploration of different microgrid configurations with minor incremental 
configuration changes. The RAP method is useful for evaluating single increments of 
system improvements. The MS Excel simulation models show promise through low-
investment development and highly observable simulation cell data. Further analysis 
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process and simulation model considerations are reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
Finally, an observation mindset is conveyed for guiding future simulation model 
interpretations. 
The modified RAP provides a pathway for incrementally evaluating resilience 
improvements from a single ESS to a quintuple ESS. Recursive evaluations of each 
resilience improvement guide targeted ESS distribution increases. For evaluating a vast set 
of improvement options, recursive evaluations for each configuration change would 
become tedious. The modified RAP remains useful for guiding the early exploration of 
targeted resilience improvements. Configuration specific simulation models share this 
orientation towards single-increment improvement evaluations.  
The MS Excel-based microgrid simulation models enable an affordable, swift 
development, and transparent exploration of microgrid configurations. Affordability infers 
that organizations possess computers with MS Excel already installed versus purchasing a 
specialized software package. Swift simulation model development is enabled by copying 
repetitive code and spreadsheet cells. For example, the first type of each simulated 
microgrid component can be copied across the current spreadsheet or into a new model. 
Transparency of intermediate simulation behavior is provided through variables displayed 
on the spreadsheet during the simulation. These intermediate values can be plotted in 
addition to resilience measures (e.g., individual ESS charge, diesel generator fuel, 
generator output). These advantages support a swift and affordable exploration of 
microgrid configurations. Intra-simulation variable updates improve the transparency of 
microgrid behavior but prolong the hazard simulation calculations.  
The hazard scenario simulations deterministically calculate resilience through 
quantifiable, capability-oriented, and behavior illuminating measures. These hazard 
scenario simulations illuminate more microgrid behavior than any standardized resilience 
measure could quantify. Observing each hazard simulation enables an intimate 
appreciation for the following interactions: 
1. Power flows from sources of generation to load allocation 
2. Inter-bus load transfers 
3. Building-specific hourly outages 
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4. Generator fuel consumption 
5. ESS charge tracking, and  
6. Other scenario-specific microgrid behavior, which can not be 
summarized by an all-encompassing resilience measure.  
For example, a hazard scenario that meets resilience measure expectations may 
display a uniquely timed power outage or a combination of power outages that illuminates 
an unacceptable outcome to stakeholders. A standardized resilience measure helps quantify 
useful microgrid performance information; but, certain hazard simulations may illuminate 
unacceptable results. Detailed power flow, energy capacities, and outage results from 
hazard scenario simulations remain useful for managing stakeholder expectations beyond 
a standardized resilience measure value.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
Microgrid energy strategy involves decisively balancing both resistance to 
microgrid stresses and adjustments to grid strains to improve resilience (Widergren et al. 
2018). Future trajectories from this research include a microgrid operating strategy,  
applied assessment, and cost-benefit incorporations. 
A microgrids propensity to affect an installation commander’s desired mission 
strategy illuminates potential “handling qualities” associated with microgrid resilience 
behavior in an operational context. Facility specific readouts of this thesis’s resilience 
measures, MI, θg, and islanding time could populate mission displays for the installation 
commander. Commander-in-the-loop anticipatory abilities could be leveraged for adapting 
to evolving mission priorities across the installation. Specifically, they could modify 
facility-specific resilience measures and acceptable disruption measures based on changing 
levels of accepted degradations for each facility.  
The missions of DOD tenant organizations have different priority levels. These 
priorities may evolve throughout a hazard event. An example of a microgrid maneuver 
would be switching prioritization from “maximize mission capabilities” to “maximize 
mission endurance.” A cockpit of energy controls and information would enable a human 
operator to switch facilities between a max range performance profile to a max endurance 
profile, remedy microgrid logic limitations, maneuver the installation, and effect an energy 
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security strategy at the operational or even tactical levels. Advantages of operator control 
capabilities could be further explored during an installation-specific assessment.  
The hazard scenario simulations from this research illuminate more microgrid 
behavior than a standardized resilience measure could quantify. Even a passive assessment 
of a specific installation could provide useful connections between hourly energy 
requirements and resource consumption. Specifically, monitoring power flows from 
generation sources and load allocated facilities could illuminate deterministic hazard 
scenario outcomes with hypothetical microgrid modifications. This appreciation also has 
utility for illuminating plausible outcomes for stakeholder discussions. For example, a 
hazard scenario, which meets resilience measure expectations, may display a uniquely 
timed power outage or combination of power outages that illuminates an unacceptable 
outcome to stakeholders. These outcomes could inform further stakeholder discussion 
involving the exploration of minor organizational adjustments, such as delayed start 
workday and telework audibles, to yield resilience improvements. Hazard scenario 
simulations provide useful information for exploring hypothetical microgrid 
configurations, illuminating unacceptable outcomes, and timing adjustments to daily 
operations. 
Cost is a vital aspect to consider when exploring different microgrid configuration 
options. In this research, overall capacities and output capabilities are held constant to 
avoid cost-benefit interactions. Future work could leverage this modified RAP and 
resilience measures across different configurations with different life-cycle costs. ESS with 
different prices will likely involve systems with different reliability. Deterministic results 
from this thesis showed no resilience increase from distributed ESS when they were all 
inoperable. Hazard simulations should be further progressed to incorporate a probabilistic 
assessment to illuminate potential reliability concerns. 
This section discussed future work encompassing a microgrid operating strategy, 
and applied resilience assessment, and cost incorporation. The most important takeaway is 
using the hazard simulations to inform stakeholders about deterministic outcomes from 
certain microgrid configurations and exploring resilience improvements due to minor 
organizational adjustments.  
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VII. SUPPLEMENTAL TO THESIS (1 OF 4: SINGLE ESS 
(BASELINE) MICROGRID SIMULATION MS EXCEL MODEL 
The single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation model MS Excel represents 
Peterson’s MATLAB-based Monterey Microgrid Simulation Model (2019) and serves as 
the most centralized ESS configuration. The single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation 
model incorporates the spreadsheet combined with Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) 
macros for executing each simulation timestep. Operating instructions reside at the top of 
the spreadsheet for configuring microgrid specifications, hazard parameters, and data 
recording. The single ESS (baseline) microgrid spreadsheets contain all required inputs to 
execute the simulation model. Contact the NPS library for access to this supplemental.  
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VIII. SUPPLEMENTAL TO THESIS (2 OF 4: DOUBLE ESS 
MICROGRID SIMULATION MS EXCEL MODEL ) 
The double ESS microgrid simulation model MS Excel represents a double ESS 
version of the single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation model. The double ESS 
microgrid simulation model incorporates the spreadsheet combined with Visual Basic for 
Applications (VBA) macros to executing each timestep. Operating instructions reside at 
the top of the spreadsheet for configuring microgrid specifications, hazard parameters, and 
data recording. The double ESS microgrid spreadsheet contains all required inputs to 
execute the simulation model. Contact the NPS library for access to this supplemental.  
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IX. SUPPLEMENTAL TO THESIS (3 OF 4: QUINTUPLE ESS 
MICROGRID SIMULATION EXCEL VBA SOURCE CODE) 
The quintuple ESS microgrid simulation model MS Excel represents a quintuple  
ESS version of the single ESS (baseline) microgrid simulation model. The quintuple ESS 
microgrid simulation model incorporates the spreadsheet combined with Visual Basic for 
Applications (VBA) macros to clear previous results and execute each of the 24 simulation 
timesteps. Operating instructions reside at the top of the spreadsheet for configuring 
microgrid specifications, hazard parameters, and data recording. The quintuple ESS 
microgrid spreadsheet contains all required inputs to execute the simulation model. Contact 
the NPS library for access to this supplemental.  
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X. SUPPLEMENTAL TO THESIS (4 OF 4: MODIFIED 
MONTEREY MATLAB SIMULATION CODE). ADAPTED FROM 
PETERSON (2019). 
This supplemental contains an adapted version of the MATLAB-based Monterey 
Microgrid Simulation Model (Peterson 2019). Adaptations were required to compare 
microgrid functionality for validating MS Excel-based single ESS microgrid simulation 
model. These adaptions involved matching microgrid input parameters, removing random-
seeding, and reducing the life-cycle simulation to a repeatable 24-hour hazard scenario 
period. Contact the NPS library for access to this supplemental. 
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APPENDIX. PRACTITIONER REFERENCE CARD 
1. Indices 
 f : Energy consuming facility node in the microgrid simulation model. 
 s : Energy generation source node in the microgrid simulation model. 
 h : Hourly timestep during the microgrid model simulation. 
 o : Outbound to the energy conservation boundary 
 i : Inbound to the energy conservation boundary 
2. Parameters: Fixed System Specification 
 fM : Assigned MI value for unmet power requirement indexed for each 
facility, f. 
 Pw: Generator Power Output Rating (KW) 
 F y : Fuel Tank Capacity (gal) 
 :mFl  Minimum Fuel (gal) 
 ) (gene : Energy generation efficiency (gal/KWh) 
 Pd : Discharge rating (KW) Discharge rating (KW) 
 C h c : Charge Capacity (KWh) 
  MCh : Maximum Charge (KWh) 
 mCh : minimum Charge (KWh) 
 ) (esse : One-way efficiency (KWh/KWh) 
 P V a : Area of Photovoltaic (PV) Solar Panels (m2) 
 ) (pve : Efficiency of PV Solar Panels (Wm2/ Wm2) 
3. Parameters: Data-Informed 
 fhLr : Energy consumption data for facility, f, during hour, h. 
 shDNI : DNI for solar energy to source, s, for each hour (W/m^2) 
4. Parameters: Scenario Informed 
 fM  : Assigned MI value for unmet power requirement indexed for each 
facility, f. 
 fhSt  : Operational state of Facility, f, during hour, h, of simulation. 
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5. Variables: Decision (DV) 
 fhP : Whether Facility, f, receives power during hour, h, of simulation. 
 shTh : Throttle output setting (%) at source, s, during hour, h. 
6. Variables: Indirect 
Facility: 
 fhL : Load consumed (KWh) by facility, f, during hour, h. 
 fhMi : Simulation-specific MI incurred by facility, f, during hour, h. 
Energy Generation/ Resource Consumption: 
 shG : Energy generated (KWh) by source, s, during hour, h. 
 shChs : ESS state of charge (KWh) by source, s, after hour, h. 
 shFs : Fuel state quantity of generation source, s, at the start of hour, h. 
7. Objective Function 
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